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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, 
each State is free to act on its own,” concluded the U.S. Supreme Court in Gov. 
Murphy v. NCAA.1 In the two years since the Supreme Court declared the partial 
federal sports betting ban in the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(“PASPA”)2 unconstitutional and, in turn, opened up the legalization of sports 
betting nationwide, there has been one topic that has garnered considerable 
attention—sports gaming data.  
‘Data’—a generic word that includes news and information about sports 
gaming—has become one of the most-discussed contemporary topics in sports 
gaming regulation globally.3 Indeed, since the Supreme Court case, the 
regulatory treatment of sports betting news, information, and data has taken a 
prominent role in dozens of legislative bodies, at numerous industry conferences, 
and in a prominent lawsuit recently filed in the United Kingdom. Industry 
 
*  Associate Professor, Florida State University. This paper was completed in 
conjunction with a non-resident research fellowship granted by the International 
Center for Gaming Regulation (“ICGR”) at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
The ICGR is an academic institute dedicated to the study of gaming regulation and 
policy development. The author would like to thank the ICGR for its research 
support and Christopher Perrigan for excellent research assistance. 
1  Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018). As 
of June 20, 2020, there remains a spin-off legal proceeding in the court system that 
is unrelated to the foci here. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 
939 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Tony Batt, U.S. Supreme Court Bats Down 
Hail Mary Pass by Sports Leagues, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (May 19, 2020). In 
addition, a considerable number of court documents from the precursors to the 
Supreme Court case remain sealed or partially redacted. See Ryan M. Rodenberg, 
Sealed Files, First Amendment Right of Access, and the Supreme Court Sports 
Betting Case, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 336 (2019).  
2  28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2018). 
3  For purposes of this paper, the words “data,” “information,” and “news” are 
treated as synonyms and used interchangeably. Likewise, the words “gaming,” 
“gambling,” “wagering,” and “betting” are used interchangeably herein.  
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attorney Andrew Nixon wrote: “Anyone close to the commercial side of sports 
content is likely to know that certain leagues, competitions or event organisers 
see the data generated during the course of their events as an important part of 
their commercial portfolios, and understandably so: data, and in particular live 
data, collected from a sports event has become a valuable commodity from a 
media perspective, and from a betting perspective.”4  
There are at least three reasons why data play a critical role in the sports 
gaming industry: “First, data are used to determine the outcome of wagers, 
including real-time bets that are made and graded almost instantaneously. 
Second, data are analyzed for statistical fingerprints indicative of possible 
integrity issues about the underlying sporting event and the tethered gambling 
markets. Third, the extent to which sports betting data are available raises a host 
of complex legal matters.”5    
In the United States, federal and state efforts to legislate in the area of sports 
gaming data create various statutory and constitutional issues. Likewise, 
competition law and property rights (if any) in Europe, Australia, and beyond 
could be implicated if lawmakers or industry players move to commercially 
consolidate data access and sales in the sports gaming space. This paper will 
analyze whether regulatory scrutiny could attach to efforts bent on monetizing 
or restricting the news and information used in sports gaming.  
This paper also explores potential regulatory action in the context of sports 
gaming data and proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a primer on the sports 
gaming data market. Part III highlights regulatory issues specific to the United 
States. Part IV pinpoints regulatory issues globally. Part V concludes with a brief 
summary discussion and outlook. 
 
II. THE SPORTS GAMING DATA MARKET 
 
A. Overview 
 
The post-PASPA market for sports betting data took shape during the 
pendency of the litigation that eventually landed at the Supreme Court.6 In early 
2016, it was reported that “U.S. sports leagues are rapidly cutting deals with 
companies involved in sports betting. To varying degrees, the leagues are 
 
4  Andrew Nixon, Data Collection from Sports Events: A Nonexclusive Future?, 
LAWINSPORT (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/data-
collection-from-sports-events-a-nonexclusive-future. 
5  Privacy, Big Data, and Competition: Hearings on Competition and Consumer 
Prot. in the 21st Century Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n, 6th Sess. (2019) 
(statement of Ryan M. Rodenberg, Assoc. Professor, Fla. State Univ.). 
6  For a historical account of sports gaming data, see James H. Frey & I. Nelson 
Rose, The Role of Sports Information Services in the World of Sports Betting, 11 
ARENA REV. 44 (1987). 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 3 
partnering—openly and in secret—with oddsmakers, betting prognosticator, and 
data providers that make sports wagering possible in the digital age.”7 Indeed, 
the entire litigation between five prominent U.S.-based sports leagues8and New 
Jersey can be seen as a vehicle for shaping how news and information are 
commercialized for sports gaming:  
 
[The] lawsuit…is not about gambling. It is about control: control of 
events, control of data, control of marketing opportunities, and control 
of current and future revenue streams. This is a clash between sports 
leagues looking to reserve opportunities to monetize sporting events as 
commodities and cash-strapped states intent to raise tax revenue via 
regulation of an industry with a massive volume of underground 
activity.9 
 
The root of the friction between the sports leagues and New Jersey 
over revenue generation rests on the yet-to-be-definitively decided 
issue of whether a sporting event itself can be owned and, if so, by 
whom.10 Indeed, in unrelated litigation, Fox Broadcasting Company, a 
broadcast partner of the MLB and NFL, posited that the dissemination 
of information related to sporting events is one in the public interest 
and analogous to a ‘parade, a natural disaster, a March on Washington, 
or a government shutdown.’11 
 
Such position runs counter to one where sporting events are treated as 
a commercially exploitable commodity. Intriguingly, this position has 
been espoused by the major media partners of all five Christie II 
 
7  Steve Fainaru, et al., Betting on the Come: Leagues Strike Deals with Gambling-
Related Firms, ESPN (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/14660326/nba-nfl-mlb-nhl-striking-
various-business-deals-gambling-related-firms. Some sports leagues, such as the 
NFL, are now preparing to allow league teams to become sports betting operators 
themselves. David Purdum, New CBA Allows Owners, Players to Cash in on 
Stadium Sportsbooks, ESPN (March 20, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/28930507/new-cba-allows-owners-players-
cash-stadium-sportsbooks.  
8  The NCAA, NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB were all co-plaintiffs in the Supreme 
Court case. 
9  Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State Regulation, and 
the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 27-28 (2015). 
10  Id. at 36. 
11  Id. at 36, n.58 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Fox Broadcasting Company and Big 
Ten Network, LLC in Support of Defendant NCAA’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 18, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 
No. 09-CV-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012). 
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plaintiff sports leagues; ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC have acknowledged 
that ‘sports broadcasts concern matters of public interest.’12 
 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the 2018 Supreme Court decision, various sports 
leagues have embarked on a five-pronged federal-state lobbying effort to 
monetize sports betting. Pushing for a so-called ‘official data requirement’ has 
consistently been one of the proffered arguments. The five-pronged lobbying 
points are set forth in Figure 1 below.13    
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
12  Id. (citing Brief of A&E Television Networks, LLC, in Support of Appellant 
NCAA and Reversal at 6, Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr. v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, -
17068 (9th Cir. 2014). 
13  Among the five pecuniary-related lobbying requests made by various sports 
leagues, the request for a so-called ‘integrity/royalty fee’ has garnered considerable 
media attention. As of June 20, 2020, no state has passed a law requiring that a 
sports league be paid any ‘integrity/royalty fee.’ Nevertheless, several sports 
leagues such as the NBA, MLB, and PGA Tour continue to publicly request that 
new legislation include such a mandatory fee. Two leagues—the NBA and MLB—
also commissioned a ‘study’ related to the request. See Spectrum Gaming Sports 
Group, Sports-Betting Royalty Fee Study (March 8, 2019)(on file with author). 
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In general, sports leagues attempt to monetize sports gaming data in two 
ways. First, sports leagues may seek to sell such data themselves. Second, sports 
leagues may partner with a third-party data broker on an exclusive14 or non-
exclusive15 basis, with the partner paying the league for the ‘right’ to disseminate 
data. The latter route has been the most popular to date, with sports league 
employees and designees describing data they sell as ‘official.’ One MLB 
employee predicted that sports gaming operators who opt against using ‘official’ 
data “won’t be around for long.”16 Widespread reporting has detailed the data-
related sales practices of sports leagues and their partners.17 
Issues pertaining to sports betting news, information, and data have been 
frequently discussed in state and federal legislative activity since the Supreme 
Court’s ruling. For example, on March 3, 2020, NFL team executive Rich 
McKay of the Atlanta Falcons reportedly told a Georgia Senate Committee that 
certain data providers are “under surveillance” during games.18 According to 
 
14  For example, the NFL has partnered with a firm named Sportradar on an 
exclusive basis. See Jill R. Dorson, NFL Gives Sportradar Exclusive Rights to 
League Data, SPORTS HANDLE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nfl-gives-
sportradar-exclusive-rights-to-league-data/; Dustin Gouker, The NFL’s Big Betting 
Deal with Sportradar: Questions and Answers, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 12, 
2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35135/nfl-betting-deal-with-sportradar-
questions-and-answers/; Eben Novy-Williams, NFL Takes First Major Gambling 
Step with Sportradar Data Deal, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-12/nfl-takes-first-major-
gambling-step-with-sportradar-data-deal. 
15  Robert H. Mann, Understanding the NBA’s Sports Betting Data Deals with 
Sportradar, Genius Sports, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://sportshandle.com/nba-sports-betting-sportradar-genius-sports-federal/. 
16  Brad Allen, MLB: Operators Not Using Official Data “Won’t Last Long,” EGR 
GLOBAL (July 2, 2019), https://egr.global/intel/news/mlb-operators-not-using-
official-data-wont-last-long/. 
17  See Matt Rybaltowski, Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding Nevada 
Sportsbooks Pay More or Get Cut Off, SPORTS HANDLE (May 2, 2019), 
https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-demands-data-fee-nv-sportsbooks/; John Holden, 
Integrity Fee Issues For NBA and MLB Run Deeper Than They Appear, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (May 10, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32378/holden-
nba-mlb-integrity-fee/; Eben Novy-Williams, As the Playoffs Heat Up, the NBA 
Looks to Profit from Gambling, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-10/as-the-playoffs-heat-up-the-
nba-looks-to-profit-from-gambling; Regina Garcia Cano, NBA, MLB Using Data to 
Chase Better Deals with Sportsbooks, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 8, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/fe1cb6a75efe4f77be41ec6ff8664069. 
18  Tony Batt & Matt Carey, Atlanta Falcons CEO Says Unofficial Sports Data 
Providers are Under Surveillance, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (March 4, 2020), 
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/atlanta-
falcons-ceo-says-unofficial-sports-data-providers-are. 
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media reports, McKay said: “We’re in a position now in our stadium where we 
have people walking around the stadium [on] game day, looking for people that 
are pushing out results, and pushing out data because people are betting on that, 
and that’s something that is very uncomfortable for us, and not something we 
were ever doing two years ago that we’re doing now.”19 Gaming has even made 
its way into the collective bargaining agreements between sports leagues and 
unionized players. A draft version of the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining 
agreement dated March 5, 2020 accounted for revenue derived from “operation 
of gambling of any kind in an NFL stadium” and “revenues related to ensuring 
the gambling-related integrity of NFL games.”20 
One motivation for the emphasis on regulating sports gaming data is to 
ensure the accuracy of betting outcomes for both consumers and operators, 
thereby preserving the integrity of the underlying betting market.21 When news, 
information, and data are manipulated, betting fraud can result. The elimination 
of betting fraud is a shared priority of regulators, customers, operators, and sports 
leagues, with leagues cognizant that fan engagement can be explained, at least in 
part, via wagering.22 The focus on betting fraud has been widespread. In May 
 
19  Id.  
20  NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70-72 (March 5, 2020), 
available at 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-
NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf. The same document calculated gambling 
revenue from wagers as “the aggregate net difference between gaming wins and 
losses (not the total amount wagered) net of all excise taxes or other gambling or 
gaming-related taxes or surcharges actually paid or owed.” 
21  In a revealing—and ironic—twist, having a single data provider (or a small 
number of data providers) has the potential to create greater integrity risks given 
the susceptibility to manipulation/failure that cannot be rebutted by a robust market 
with multiple providers to correct any errors. Ryan Rodenberg & Jack Kerr, Fake 
News, Manipulated Data, and the Future of Betting Fraud, ESPN (June 27, 2017), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19752031/future-sports-betting-fake-news-
manipulated-data-future-betting-fraud.  
22  For academic discussions of this issue, see Nick Burkhart & Dylan Welsh, The 
Legalization of Sports Gambling: An Irreparable Harm or the Beginning of 
Unprecedented Growth?, 21 SPORTS L.J. 145 (2014); Brad R. Humphreys, et al., 
Consumption Benefits and Gambling: Evidence from the NCAA Basketball Betting 
Market, 39 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 376 (2013); Christine Hurt, Regulating Public 
Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and 
the Speculation Paradox, 86 B. U. L. REV. 371 (2006); Steven Salaga & Scott 
Tainsky, Betting Lines and College Football Television Ratings, 132 ECON. 
LETTERS 112 (2015). Contrary to prior statements—including some made under 
oath in court proceedings—about injury and irreparable harm from sports gaming, 
multiple sports leagues have now attested that “[s]ports betting gives fans another 
exciting way to engage with the sports they love [and] a legal and regulated sports 
betting market…would be beneficial to sports and their fans…” Joint Statement 
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2017, U.S. Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ) introduced federal sports betting 
legislation that required “[a]ppropriate safeguards to ensure, to a reasonable 
degree of certainty, that a bet or wager is fair and honest, and to prevent, to a 
reasonable degree of certainty, cheating (including collusion and the use of a 
cheating device).”23 More narrowly, a spotlight has been put on the transmitter 
of news, information, and data from a sporting event: 
 
Betting fraudsters have discovered a far simpler target: the data scout. 
Data scouts are those who log play-by-play information on location, in 
real time. They watch the entire game, manually updating the action as 
it progresses. They are the filter through which all details must pass, 
and without them, the global betting industry—especially in-play 
betting—would grind to a halt. In the lower tiers of sport, data scouts 
might be a game’s only link to the outside world, and that makes them 
potentially more valuable than a crooked referee or bent goalkeeper. 
After all, why go to the trouble of fixing a match when you can simply 
pay the data scout to delay logging the result long enough to make a 
strategic bet? All it takes is 30 seconds…The problem of data delays is 
particularly embarrassing for tennis. The chair umpires might 
themselves be the data scouts, feeding numbers into a touchscreen 
tablet and, from there, to the gambling world. Recently, tennis umpires 
from three different countries were banned after involvement in such a 
scam…But delayed data are only the start. Fake data from nonexistent 
sporting events occur, too. Once fraudsters realized they could control 
the flow of information between the field and the database, it was only 
a matter of time before fictional matches started to appear. Those are 
called ‘ghost games.’ How do they work? A data scout in some far-
flung corner of the world enters a fake game into the system, perhaps 
with the help of an industry insider, and then logs the phantom match, 
play-by-play, in any direction the fraudsters require. If no vetting 
occurs, the ghost game can be picked up by gambling operators who 
fail to double-check the game’s authenticity.24      
 
from the Commissioners of the National Basketball Association, National Hockey 
League, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, and Canadian Football 
League (June 8, 2020), available at http://canadiangaming.ca/wp-
content/uploads/Leagues-Joint-Statement.pdf.  
23  Rodenberg, supra note 21.  
24  Id. See also Ryan Rodenberg, How Gambling ‘Courtsiders’ are Affecting 
Tennis, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13481104/how-courtsiders-affecting-
gambling-integrity-tennis-chalk (courtsiders are people who attend tennis 
tournaments “for the purpose of transmitting data in real time to employers who are 
often continents away”). An executive at a sports gaming data dissemination firm 
recently described the vast number of data scouts his company employs: “Our 
focus is on procuring the most reliable, high quality data, and we do [so] by 
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A useful comparison can be made between sports gaming data and stock 
market data. Scholar Jerry Markham recently chronicled the latter’s history, 
revealing some parallels to the nascent market for sports betting data, news, and 
information, especially that of the real-time variety.25 According to Markham, 
during the early days of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) there was a 
‘curb market’ that existed on the street due to “the NYSE’s exclusive access to 
members only.”26 Markham continued: 
 
During the Civil War, NYSE did relent somewhat on nonmember 
access to its market data. Nonmembers were allowed to listen to 
trading on NYSE ‘through a keyhole for [a fee of] $100.’ After the 
war, spectators were also allowed to watch trading from the gallery of 
the new NYSE floor…for a fee of only $50. This set a precedent for 
selectively providing access to exchange market data for a fee.27 
 
Decades later, Markham detailed how “the NYSE created the New York 
Quotation Company to handle the distribution of its trading data.”28 Likewise, 
the stock ticker “further facilitated the development of the market for exchange 
data.”29 Issues pertaining to ownership of trading prices spread to the 
commodities market too. According to Markham: 
 
[T]he Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (“CBOT”) and other 
commodity exchanges generated valuable market data for traders. This 
data became a highly marketable commodity, and the CBOT 
contracted with the Western Union telegraph company to provide data 
 
employing over 7,000 data scouts worldwide, covering over 20,000 live events 
each month.” See Sport Industry Group, David Lampitt Q&A—Sportradar: Data 
Data Data (July 3, 2019), https://www.sportindustry.biz/features/david-lampitt-qa-
%E2%80%93-sportradar-data-data-data. See also Press Release, Tennis Integrity 
Unit, Venezuelan Match Official Armando Alfonso Belardi Gonzalez Suspended 
and Fined for Corruption Offenses, TENNIS INTEGRITY UNIT (June 19, 2020), 
https://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/media-releases/venezuelan-match-official-
armando-alfonso-belardi-gonzalez-suspended-and-fined-corruption-offences 
(“…Mr Gonzalez had…failed to report two approaches he received in 2018 
soliciting him to become involved in a corrupt scheme to manipulate match 
scores…”). 
25  See generally Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market 
Data to High-Frequency Traders, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1209 (2019).  
26  Id. at 1216–17 (“In 1837, the NYSE discovered that some nonmember traders 
had drilled a hole through a brick wall at the NYSE building that allowed them to 
overhear surreptitiously NYSE trading activity.”). 
27  Id. at 1217 (internal citations omitted). 
28  Id.  
29  Id. 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 9 
from its trading floor to subscribers throughout the country. The 
CBOT used its control over this trading data to fend off competitive 
threats from ‘bucket shop’ operators.30 
 
Litigation ensued after a variety of companies in the industry “claimed that 
exchange market data was a matter of public interest and not exchange 
property.”31 In 1905, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Chicago Board 
of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.,32 finding that “the plaintiff’s collection 
of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade secret. 
The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for doing, 
to itself.”33 Markham concluded that the Supreme Court’s ruling “set a strong 
precedent for the proprietary treatment of such information as a commodity that 
could be selectively sold to preferred market participants.”34 Markham also 
detailed the latency advantages derived from being in close proximity to the 
trading floor:   
 
Exchange trading data was also available on an even more privileged 
basis to traders operating on the floors of the stock exchanges. Those 
exchange members were given a time and place advantage over other 
traders. This is because stock quotations and last-sale reports were 
disclosed on the floor in advance of their transmission to other traders 
by telegraph or publication in newspapers. That time and place 
advantage meant that floor traders trading for their own accounts could 
respond to current, real-time market data before off-exchange traders 
received that information. This provided a tremendous trading 
advantage to the floor traders. The cost of that access was the 
requirement that the floor traders purchase an often very expensive 
membership on the exchange and pay membership fees.35  
 
The applicability of the data-specific analogy between stock exchanges and 
sports is illustrated when looking at prior statements made by various leagues. 
During the lead-up to the Supreme Court case, the NCAA, NHL, NBA, MLB, 
and NFL claimed to have a proprietary interest in “the degree to which others 
 
30  Id. at 1218 (internal citations omitted). 
31  Id. (citing J. Harold Mulherin, et al., Prices are Property: The Organization of 
Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON., 591 
(1991)). 
32  Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 
(1905). 
33  Id. at 250. 
34  Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to 
High-Frequency Traders, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1209, 1218 (2019).  
35  Id. at 1219 (internal citations omitted). 
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derive economic benefits from their own games.”36 The same five leagues also 
posited that they “have an essential interest in how their games are perceived and 
the degree to which their sporting events become betting events.”37 In a different 
court filing, the same leagues referenced “legally protected interests of the 
organizations that produce the underlying games.”38   
Years earlier, the NFL, NHL, and MLB argued that they “share a common 
interest with the NBA in protecting and preserving for professional sports 
leagues and their member clubs, the rights to, and commercial value of, exclusive 
presentation of real-time running accounts of the live professional sporting event 
that result from their efforts and investments.”39 The position was also furthered 
via Congressional testimony when PASPA was being considered by the Senate. 
According to then-NBA executive David Stern: “Conducting a sports lottery or 
permitting sports gambling involves the use of professional sports leagues’ 
games, scores, statistics and team logos, in order to take advantage of a particular 
league’s popularity; such use violates, misappropriates and infringes upon 
numerous league property rights.”40  
More recently, an MLB employee testified during a government proceeding 
in Washington State that the “statutory and regulatory structure must recognize 
that sports betting is derivative of the games—i.e. without sports there is no 
sports betting.”41 Similarly, the same MLB employee warned a Colorado 
government entity about ‘pirated’ data collected in alleged violation of ticketing 
terms or scraped from a website.42 A ‘coalition’ of sports leagues, including 
MLB, NBA, and PGA Tour, also told the Washington State Gambling 
 
36  Response Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, Nos. 13 13-1713, 13-1714, 13-1715 (D.N.J. 2013). 
37  Id. at 13-14. 
38  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint at 1, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. 
Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013). 
39  Brief for The National Football League, The Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball and the National Hockey League as Amici Curiae Supporting the National 
Basketball Association and NBA Properties, Inc. at 9, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. 
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir. 1996)(No. 96-7975). 
40  Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
On Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. at 51 (testimony of David J. Stern) (1991). 
41  Brad Allen, MLB: Betting is a ‘Derivative’ of Sport and Leagues Should be 
Compensated as Such, EGR GLOBAL (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://egr.global/intel/news/mlb-betting-is-a-derivative-of-sport-and-leagues-
should-be-compensated-as-such/.  
42  Matt Rybaltowski, Colorado Stakeholders Offer Diverging Views on Data 
Licensing at Integrity Working Group, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://sportshandle.com/colorado-stakeholders-integrity-working-group/ (at the 
same hearing, other testimony alluded to a “some concern that the leagues and its 
partners will ‘circuitously’ create a monopolistic situation”).  
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Commission about why they should be entitled to a ‘royalty:’43 
 
 
 
In Ohio, the NFL, Cleveland Browns, and Cincinnati Bengals sent a letter to 
lawmakers asking them to consider, among other things, “[p]rotection of our 
content and intellectual property, including from those who attempt to steal or 
misuse it.”44 The Cincinnati Reds, in an unsigned submission to Ohio lawmakers, 
also alluded to disfavored data collection methods:45 
 
A PGA Tour representative submitted testimony in Ohio and pinpointed 
 
43  Sports League Coalition Presentation to Washington State Gambling 
Commission at 21 (Oct. 10, 2019) (on file with author). 
44  Letter from Bob Bedinghaus, et al. to Representative Scott Oelslager and 
Representative Jack Cera at 1 (Oct. 8, 2019). 
45  Cincinnati Reds Written Submission (Oct. 9, 2019). 
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“web scrapers and on-site operatives:”46 
 
 
 
In Illinois, a lobbyist for the NBA, PGA Tour, and MLB submitted proposed 
rulemaking that addressed both courtsiding and web scraping under the umbrella 
of an ‘official league data’ requirement:47 
 
 
Given these positions, it was forecasted—in 2016 Congressional 
testimony—that “it is plausible to infer that certain sports leagues may: (i) seek 
to memorialize certain gaming-related intellectual property rights through 
litigation or legislation; (ii) move to license so-called “official data rights” to 
third party gaming operators; and/or (iii) create gaming platforms themselves to 
offer (exclusive) wagering options directly to consumers and, in turn, cut out 
competitors.”48 The forecast stemmed from the conclusion that “[p]roprietary 
and non-proprietary real-time data are the fuel for burgeoning live wagering and 
 
46  Testimony of Andy Levinson, PGA Tour, [Ohio] House Finance Comm., 
Hearing on HB 194 (Oct. 9, 2019). 
47  Letter from Jeremy Kudon to Chairman Charles Schmadeke, Illinois Gaming 
Bd. (Sept. 27, 2019). 
48  Daily Fantasy Sports: Issues and Perspectives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 114th Cong. 42 (2016) (statement of Ryan M. Rodenberg). In accord, 
see Ryan Rodenberg, Wagering on the Future, ESPN THE MAGAZINE (Feb. 03, 
2015), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12251828/gambling-issue-charles-
barkley-five-voices-debating-sports-gambling-legalization (“Leagues will posit that 
types of data are proprietary (think sabermetrics meets sports gambling) and will 
seek licensing fees from sportsbooks and fantasy operators. The leagues will also 
look to offer wagering options to consumers. Finally, like fantasy’s emphasis on 
player outcomes, sports betting will continue to shift sporting events from 
competition between teams and players to a commercialized spectacle. Gambling 
and fantasy drive consumer interest.”). 
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in-game fantasy sports.”49 Such forecast is not novel. Almost forty years earlier, 
the NFL had made similar claims against Delaware when the state looked to offer 
a football-themed lottery game. In ruling against the NFL, the federal judge 
wrote extensively about the NFL’s claim that the state was seeking to reap what 
it had not sown: 
It is undoubtedly true that defendants seek to profit from the popularity 
of NFL football. The question, however, is whether this constitutes 
wrongful misappropriation. I think not. We live in an age of economic 
and social interdependence. The NFL undoubtedly would not be in the 
position it is today if college football and the fan interest that it 
generated had not preceded the NFL’s organization. To that degree it 
has benefited from the labor of others. The same, of course, can be said 
for the mass media networks which the labor of others have developed. 
What the Delaware Lottery has done is to offer a service to that portion 
of plaintiffs’ following who wish to bet on NFL games. It is true that 
Delaware is thus making profits it would not make but for the 
existence of the NFL, but I find this difficult to distinguish from the 
multitude of charter bus companies who generate profit from servicing 
those of plaintiffs’ fans who want to go to the stadium or, indeed, the 
sidewalk popcorn salesman who services the crowd as it surges 
towards the gate. While courts have recognized that one has a right to 
one's own harvest, this proposition has not been construed to preclude 
others from profiting from demands for collateral services generated 
by the success of one’s business venture. General Motors’ cars, for 
example, enjoy significant popularity and seat cover manufacturers 
profit from that popularity by making covers to fit General Motors' 
seats. The same relationship exists between hot dog producers and the 
bakers of hot dog rolls. But in neither instance, I believe, could it be 
successfully contended that an actionable misappropriation occurs.50 
Researcher Christian Frodl divided up sports gaming data into three 
categories: (i) fixtures; (ii) event data and performance data; and (iii) raw data 
and refined data.51 Fixtures is a catch-all category that includes items such as the 
competition schedule, player line-ups, and game rules.52 The second category—
event data and performance data—captures the individual events taking place 
within the competition as well as tethered information such as fan attendance and 
 
49  Daily Fantasy Sports: Issues and Perspectives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 114th Cong. 42 n.48 (2016) (statement of Ryan M. Rodenberg). 
50  Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 
1977). 
51  Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of Event Owners 
Over Information and Statistics Generated about Their Sports Events, 26 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 55, 57 (2015). 
52  Id.  
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weather.53 Included here is high-tech data invisible to the naked eye and only 
derived from digital cameras, body sensors, or microchips placed in game 
equipment.54 The final category includes box-score type of news as well as 
aggregate information compiled after (or during) the event, such as “overall 
passes in a soccer match or…unforced errors in a tennis match.”55 
 
The structure of the sports gaming data market can be described as follows: 
 
The market for sports betting information is best explained through a 
linguistic flowchart with several forks in the road. The first fork in the 
road bifurcates sports betting data according to time, with two prongs: 
(i) historical and (ii) real-time/in-game. The market for historical 
sports betting information is largely decentralized and easy to access, 
with market participants finding requisite information about already-
completed game scores or archived player-level performance statistics 
from a variety of widely available sources, including television, radio, 
internet, or via phone from on-site spectators. In contrast, the market 
for real-time/in-game sports betting news is contentious and involves 
certain market participants taking measures to centralize distribution 
channels via on-site access restrictions, demand letters, litigation, and 
legislative lobbying. 
The second fork in the road branches out from the real-time/in-game 
path, with one prong for proprietary data and the other prong for non-
proprietary data.56 Proprietary data in the sports betting realm includes 
information generated from high-tech sources such as digital tracking 
cameras, microchips in balls, and biometric devices worn by athletes. 
Such proprietary information is effectively invisible to the naked eye 
and remains in the private domain until released—immediately or 
otherwise—by the licensor or owner. Tech-generated proprietary data 
currently plays very little role in the sports betting data market. The 
other fork at this stage involves non-proprietary live data such as up-
to-the-second game scores or as-it-happens player performances with 
only minimal latency. Sports leagues such as the [NBA] and [MLB] 
 
53  Id. at 58. 
54  Id. at 59. 
55  Id. 
56  For an overview of whether sports betting information, news, and data can be 
owned, see Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., Real-Time Sports Data and the First 
Amendment, 11 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 101 (2015). Although beyond the 
scope of this paper, an analysis of a market where the underlying product (news, 
information, and data) may be neither owned nor controlled would lend itself to a 
peculiar, and perhaps paradoxical, antitrust review. Likewise, if a sports league 
suddenly started claiming ownership of such data after decades of silence and non-
enforcement, the possibility of the laches defense presents itself too. 
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have been lobbying in favor of statutory ‘data mandates’ that attach to 
such real-time/in-game information used for betting. 
The third road fork extends from the non-proprietary real-time/in-game 
data prong. The first attaches to so-called ‘unofficial data’ that are 
collected on-site by individuals or by other means (e.g. computer 
scripts or drones) operating without the explicit approval of the sports 
league involved in the underlying contest or game. Collectors of such 
‘unofficial data’ count sports betting operators as customers in their 
distribution chain. The second attaches to so-called ‘official data’ that 
are collected on-site or by other means by a sports league itself or by 
one or more individuals who operate with a sports league’s approval. 
Collectors of such ‘official data’ also count sports betting operators as 
customers in their distribution chain. 
The fourth and final fork in the road spawns from the ‘official data’ 
path… The first prong extends to an individual sports league with in-
house capabilities to vacuum up sports betting-relevant information 
and sell it directly to sports book operators. The second prong is 
occupied by data dissemination firms operating with the respective 
league’s stamp of approval. Such data dissemination firms—operating 
as an intermediary, broker, or agent—then turn around and sell the 
information collected to sports betting operators and others. States like 
Tennessee[, Michigan,] and Illinois with statutory ‘data mandates’ 
attach along this fourth prong, purportedly requiring sports betting 
operators to purchase information from either a sports league or a 
league designee.57 
 
 
 
 
The structure of the market can also be visually represented in Figure 2 on the 
next page: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57  Ryan M. Rodenberg, Antitrust Standing After Apple v. Pepper: Application to 
the Sports Betting Data Market, 64(4) ANTITRUST BULLETIN 584, 588–589 (2019). 
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Figure 2 
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The sport of tennis provides a useful case study on the structure of the sports 
gaming market too. According to a recent commissioned study:  
 
[T]he ATP, WTA, and ITF have entered into contracts to sell live 
scoring for almost all their events. The ATP and WTA agreed to sell 
their live scoring data to Enetpulse in 2011, and the ITF agreed to sell 
its live scoring data to Sportradar in 2012. While generating millions 
of dollars in revenue annually, those contracts have permitted betting 
operators to offer a far broader range of bets on a far greater number of 
tennis matches, especially at the [l]owest [l]evel of ITF events. Before 
this (sic) data became available, betting operators could not offer in-
play markets unless: [(i)] they purchased unofficial data from a data 
supply company that had entered into a data sales agreement with an 
individual tournament or otherwise; [(ii)] they sent their own scouts to 
an event; [(iii)] a match was available on a live broadcast; or [(iv)] 
scores were capable of being instantly ‘scraped’ from the internet.58 
 
The interplay between and among different classifications of data is an issue 
that crosses continents. In Europe, for example, there is a ‘database right’ that 
may attach to certain compilations of data. However, a commentator has opined 
that “[t]he database right applies whether the data is collected under the auspices 
of an official league data deal or via open source means. It has led to a situation 
whereby all three major suppliers in the space—Sportradar, StatsPerform, and 
Genius Group—now provide both types of data to their clients.”59 A BetGenius 
executive described the broad scope of its company offerings as follows: “The 
BetGenius solution delivers live sports data feeds, price management support for 
pre-game and in-play odds across all major U.S. and international sports, as well 
as a bespoke, end-to-end price and risk management advisory service.”60 The 
peculiar way in which data are labeled—and the impact on integrity-related 
concerns—were addressed by a Sportradar executive in 2019: 
We’re transparent about the fact that there is a place for both official 
and open-source data in the market. This has long been the case and 
every major data supply company provides a mix of official and open-
 
58  ADAM LEWIS, ET AL., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INTEGRITY IN TENNIS: FINAL 
REPORT 20 (2018) (on file with author). 
59  Scott Longley, European Blueprint Provides Official League Data Guidance for 
US Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35557/official-league-data-europe-us-sports-
betting. 
60  Tom Washington, BetGenius Provides Resorts World Catskills’ Sportsbook with 
Trusted Pricing, Data, and Risk Solutions, GENIUS SPORTS (Sept. 3, 2019), 
http://news.geniussports.com/betgenius-provides-resorts-world-catskills-with-
trusted-solutions. 
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source data. Having said that, the majority of Sportradar’s data is 
official and we invest in official relationships with sports where there 
is genuine value that can be unlocked and protected. For sports bodies, 
having an official supply of data can enhance integrity as, importantly, 
it enables a contractual link between the sport, the data supplier and 
the betting operator which can help with setting requirements around 
information-sharing for integrity purposes, for example. However, 
there is also an integrity benefit to having multiple sources of data. 
This is simply because having a single source of truth leads to at least 
two problems: firstly it means there is a single point of failure which 
can potentially create significant financial risk in the betting market; 
secondly it can lead to “information monopolies” which stifle 
competition and innovation in the data business, ultimately leading to 
consumer harm (through increased cost or lack of choice). This means 
that generally speaking we advocate for non-exclusive data 
partnerships, particularly outside the very top tier of sports 
competition, as well as for the fact that open-source data collection has 
a valid part to play in a healthy market.61 
B. Collecting and Disseminating Sports Gaming Data  
 
Latency-related advances in technology have allowed for the 
commodification of real-time data, opening up new possibilities in sports 
gaming. Indeed, such advances “have allowed spectators, professional sports 
gamblers, journalists, and business-minded innovators to attend sporting events 
and disseminate real-time information through several mediums.”62 Sports 
leagues—sometimes working in concert with exclusive or near-exclusive data 
brokers—have similarly moved to monetize the distribution of real-time sports 
data “while simultaneously trying to limit others’ ability to do so.”63  
The practice of quickly transmitting news and information about sporting 
events for betting purposes is often called ‘courtsiding,’ a word likely derived 
 
61  See Sport Industry Group, David Lampitt Q&A—Sportradar: Data Data Data 
(July 3, 2019), https://www.sportindustry.biz/features/david-lampitt-qa-–-
sportradar-data-data-data#pfPJ40iqZipt8D5v.99. 
62  Ryan M. Rodenberg, et al., Real-Time Sports Data and the First Amendment, 11 
WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 65 (2015). 
63  Id. Although outside the scope of this paper, an ancillary issue pertaining to data 
collection methods takes place in the anti-match-fixing integrity monitoring 
industry—namely, companies in this space use crawler software to scrape odds 
from hundreds of bookmakers worldwide and it is uncertain whether such 
companies pay each bookmaker for such data and/or receive pre-approval to do so. 
See Tom Ward, Inside the Endless Fight to Kill the $1 Trillion Match-Fixing 
Industry, WIRED UK (July 9, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/football-
betting-match-fixing-odds-sportradar. 
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from the activity in tennis, a sport that has been at the forefront of speedy gaming 
data for years.64 For example, tennis governing bodies, such as the ATP Tour 
and WTA Tour, are among several leagues that embargo public domain data for 
multiple seconds as a way to protect lucrative gambling-specific distribution 
deals.65 Courtsiding is valuable to gamblers because communication from inside 
the stadium is faster (and sometimes more accurate) than a delayed television, 
radio, or internet broadcast. Sports leagues have described courtsiding by non-
approved third parties as a threat to integrity or an illegal activity. Such leagues 
have tried to curb the practice in a variety of ways, including surveillance, notices 
to spectators, ticket purchase agreements, and credentials for members of the 
media. Sports league employees testifying before state governmental bodies have 
also followed scripted speaking points about ‘pirated’ data.66 
Existing federal law could also curb sports gaming transmissions by sports 
leagues, third party gamblers, or otherwise. The Wire Act potentially attaches to 
anyone “engaged in the business of betting or wagering.”67 While most precedent 
 
64  For an overview of what courtsiding entails, see Craig Dickson, ‘Courtsiding’ in 
Sport: Cheating, Sharp Practice, or Merely Irritating?, LAWINSPORT (March 13, 
2015), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/courtsiding-in-sport-cheating-
sharp-practice-or-merely-irritating. High-speed betting in tennis has been covered 
extensively. See generally BRAD HUTCHINS, GAME, SET, CASH! INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TENNIS TRADING (2014); see also Carl Bialik, Inside 
the Shadowy World of High-Speed Tennis Betting, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 29, 
2014), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/inside-the-shadowy-world-of-high-
speed-tennis-betting. Greg Bishop & John Martin, Tennis’s New Concern; Data 
Harvesting, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/sports/tennis/tenniss-new-concern-data-
harvesting.html. 
65  Danielle Rossingh, Gamblers May Lose Edge as Tennis Tours Sell Live Scores, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-09-
28/tennis-tours-sell-live-scores-to-curb-illegal-data-collection-raise-funds. 
66  John Holden, Ahoy! Leagues Say There Be Pirates Stealing Sports Betting 
Data!, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov. 29, 2019), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/36087/mlb-pga-tour-sports-betting-data. For a 
recent example from California, see Letter from NBA, et al., to Hon. Bill Dodd 
(June 1, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/CA-League-letter.pdf (“The only dependable way to offer 
in-game bets is to use official data that is produced by sports leagues in real time. 
The alternative—using pirated and other unofficial data sources for these bets—
creates a high risk of inconsistent betting results and resulting damage to consumer 
confidence.”). 
67  18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). The relevant portion of the Wire Act reads as follows:  
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly 
uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or 
foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing 
of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission 
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suggests that the Wire Act’s reach extends only to bookmakers,68 the scope of 
the statute has been litigated and studied for decades.69 A recent in-depth study 
found the Wire Act to have boundaries: 
 
[The phrase] “the business of betting or wagering” is not a broad, 
limitless phrase applicable to all businesses whose commercial 
activities relate to gambling in some way or manner. Rather, the phrase 
is very precise language directed at businesses that themselves bet or 
wager with others and thereby risk or stake money in a game or contest 
that the business may win or lose depending upon an eventuality.70  
 
Such a conclusion is consistent with the Wire Act’s safe harbor for 
“transmission[s] in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news 
reporting of sporting events,”71 but could be scrutinized if the sporting event 
itself was formed to create gaming content and funded/organized by an entity 
also in the business of disseminating data, setting betting lines, and monitoring 
gaming integrity-related issues.72   
With transmission speed of news and information relevant to sports gaming 
at a premium,73 one approach that that was recently permitted by a federal 
 
of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or 
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the 
placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.  
68  See United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp 324 (D. R.I. 1981); see also United 
States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). 
69  See James H. Frey & I. Nelson Rose, The Role of Sports Information Services in 
the World of Sports Betting, 11 ARENA REV. 44, 48, 49 (1987). 
70  Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, The Business of Betting or Wagering:’ A 
Unifying View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 446 (2009). For 
additional discussion, see Brief for the United States in Opposition, Cohen v. 
United States, 536 U.S. 922 (2002) (No. 01-1234 ) (on file with author) and United 
States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d. Cir. 2001). See also John T. Holden, Through the 
Wire Act, 96 WASH. L. REV. 677, 718 (2020).  
71  18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).  
72  See generally SportBusiness Staff, Genius’ New ‘Grand Slam’ Tennis Series 
Creates Content for Betting Markets, SPORTBUSINESS (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.sportbusiness.com/news/genius-sports-joins-forces-with-topnotch-
management-for-new-tennis-series/. 
73  See Marcus Townend, Racing Out to Ban Drones over Fears They ‘Give 
Punters Unfair Edge,’ DAILY MAIL (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/racing/article-6595747/Drones-flown-British-
tracks-stream-live-races-punters-unfair-edge.html; see also Ryan Rodenberg, How 
Gambling ‘Courtsiders’ Are Affecting Tennis, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13481104/how-courtsiders-affecting-
gambling-integrity-tennis-chalk.  
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regulator involved artificial ‘speed bumps’ to inhibit the advantages of those with 
ultra-fast data access.74 The context for the speed bump approach was a U.S.-
based futures market involving an exchange that desired to add a multi-
millisecond barrier to “reduce the latency advantages between traders engaged 
in arbitrage strategies against related markets.”75 The applicant explained 
further:76 
 
 
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) permitted the 
speed bump implementation.77 
Beyond in-person data collection via courtsiding, sports betting news and 
information can also be obtained via scraping a website with near-real-time 
feeds. A U.S. federal law called the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) 
bans unauthorized access to a computer.78 Resulting case law has focused on 
when access is ‘authorized’ or not, with diverging results.79 Scholar Orin Kerr 
has posited that “authorization to access a computer is contingent on trespass 
norms.”80 The Ninth Circuit recently decided a CFAA case that is—as of June 
20, 2020—at the certiorari stage at the Supreme Court.81 For purposes of a 
preliminary injunction motion, the Ninth Circuit held that the CFAA does not 
necessarily criminalize web scrapers who access publicly-available data for 
 
74  Alexander Osipovich, Path Cleared for Futures ‘Speed Bump,’ WALL ST. J. 
(May 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/first-speed-bump-coming-to-u-s-
futures-markets-11557924822. 
75  Letter from Jason V. Fusco, Asst. Gen. Coun., Market Regulation, ICE Futures 
U.S., Inc. to Christopher J. Kirkpatrick, Sec. of Comm’n, Office of the Secretariat, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n at 1 (Feb. 1, 2019) (on file with author). 
76  Id. 
77  CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight Issues Statement on the Certification of 
ICE Futures U.S., Inc. Submission No. 19-119 (May 15, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
78  18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
79  On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court granted cert in Van Buren v. United 
States, 206 L. Ed. 2d 822 (Apr. 20, 2020) and could address the circuit split that has 
developed about the scope of the CFAA. 
80  See Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 
(2016); see also Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the 
Crime of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477 (2016). The CFAA has also been 
analyzed under a void-for-vagueness lens. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges 
to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1575 (2010). 
81  hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019). In seeking a 
declaratory judgment, hiQ did not further a laches argument, a potentially relevant 
issue in the sports gaming data context. 
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commercial reasons, even if the website owner has stated that it does not approve 
of such access.82 The Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he data hiQ seeks to access 
is not owned by LinkedIn.”83 While casting doubt on the prospects of CFAA 
liability, the Ninth Circuit did point out that other claims could be available, such 
as trespass to chattels, copyright infringement, misappropriation, unjust 
enrichment, conversion, break of contract, or breach of privacy.84 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling is likely welcome news to sports gaming 
data brokers and operators unwilling (or unable) to pay for access to news and 
information already in the public domain. The ruling came down at about the 
same time that sports league lobbyists and employees were testifying before state 
governments on related topics. In Michigan, lobbying activity resulted in the 
insertion of language that would prohibit a sports gaming operator from 
obtaining data originating from “live event attendees in violation of terms of 
admittance” or “automated computer programs that compile data from the 
internet in violation of terms of service.”85 An MLB employee and Seattle 
Mariners employee specifically mentioned “online scraping” (and “courtsiding”) 
in a joint presentation to the Washington State Gambling Commission excerpted 
below:86  
 
 
 
82  Id. at 993. Notably, the Ninth Circuit viewed the CFAA as an anti-hacking 
statute, not a misappropriation law. 
83  Id. at 1003. 
84  Id. at 1004 (citing Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. 
Supp. 2d 537, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
85  Matthew Kredell, Michigan Lawmaker Ready to Take a Swing at Sports Betting 
Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32607/michigan-sports-betting-bill-2019/. 
86  Quest Meeks & Fred Rivera, Sports League Coalition Presentation to 
Washington State Gambling Commission at 17 (2019) (on file with author). 
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Attention focused on how sports gaming data are collected and disseminated 
will continue regardless of whether additional states enact so-called ‘official 
data’ statutes. In states where such mandates are enacted, it remains to be seen 
if: (i) regulatory scrutiny attaches to licensed operators who opt to obtain sports 
gaming data outside the proscribed channels or (ii) licensed operators will adopt 
an offensive litigation strategy to counteract any mandate. In the absence of such 
mandates, issues surrounding collecting and disseminating sports gaming data 
will persist. For example, litigation will likely ensue if efforts are undertaken by 
sporting event organizers to restrict the flow of news and information relevant to 
sports gaming.  
 
III. POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCRUTINY OF THE SPORTS GAMING DATA 
MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
A. Federal 
 
Congress has a long history of passing legislation specific to sports gaming. 
Examples include the Wire Act of 1961,87 the Sports Bribery Act of 1964,88 
PASPA in 1992,89 and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006.90 Eight years after PASPA, Congress also considered revising the statute 
to prohibit betting on high school and college sports nationwide, with no 
grandfathered-in exemption for Nevada.91 From the 106th Congress (1999-2000) 
to the 112th Congress (2011-2012), federal lawmakers also considered a host of 
other legislative bills that would have impacted the sports gaming space.92 
Although nothing on-point has been enacted as of June 20, 2020, Congress has 
preliminarily addressed regulatory issues pertaining to sports betting news, 
information, and data in response to the recent Supreme Court ruling. On 
December 19, 2018, ex-Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Senator Chuck 
Schumer (D-NY) co-introduced the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 
2018, with sports betting data described as “one of the difficult issues to be 
considered as part of the sports wagering discussion.”93 The draft bill defined 
 
87  18 U.S.C. § 1084. 
88  18. U.S.C. § 224. 
89  28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704. 
90  31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367. 
91  The Senate version of the bill sponsored by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) was S. 
2021: High School and College Gambling Prohibition Act. The House version of 
the same bill was H.R. 3575: Student Athlete Protection Act. Neither bill became 
law.  
92  See Anastasios Kaburakis & Ryan Rodenberg, Gambling Sausage: Federal 
Legislation in the New Millenium, 16 GAMING L. REV. ECON. 500, 505 (2012). 
93  115 CONG. REC. S7930 (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch (for himself and for Sen. 
Charles Schumer)) (2018) (mentioning “the basis for requiring the use of so-called 
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‘Authorized Data’ as follows: 
 
(5) AUTHORIZED DATA.—(A) RESULT OF A SPORTS WAGER.—(A) 
MARKET TRANSITION PERIOD.—With respect to any sports wager 
accepted on or before December 31, 2024, provide that a sports 
wagering operator shall determine the result of a sports wager only 
with data that is licensed and provided by—(I) the applicable sports 
organization; or (II) an entity expressly authorized by the applicable 
sports organization to provide such information.94 
 
If Congress were to recycle the foregoing data-specific language in a 
subsequent sports gaming bill, the data-specific clause could face legal scrutiny 
on multiple fronts. Such was the case for PASPA years before the Supreme Court 
declared PASPA unconstitutional. For example, in the course of discussing 
PASPA’s carve-outs for certain states, the Court found such exemptions derived 
from “obscured Congressional purposes.”95 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
raised other concerns: “It is particularly troubling that [PASPA] would permit 
enforcement of its provisions by sports leagues.”96 Further, according to the DOJ: 
“[I]t is left to the states to decide whether to permit gambling activities based 
 
official league data”). If Congress were to legislate in the sports gaming space, one 
key issue would be whether any such legislation would treat all states equally or—
as illustrated by PASPA’s unequal treatment of states—include differing standards 
among the states. Any differing treatment raises equal sovereignty concerns. See 
Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting has an Equal Sovereignty 
Problem, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2017). The 2018 draft bill received 
widespread public support from U.S.-based sports leagues. For example, the United 
States Tennis Association (“USTA”) wrote a two-page letter to then-Senator Hatch 
and Senator Schumer to “enthusiastically add our voice to the coalition of sport 
organizations that seek a national framework for sport wagering.” Letter from 
Gordon A. Smith, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director, USTA to The 
Honorable Orrin Hatch and The Honorable Chuck Schumer (December 19, 2018) 
(on file with author). While the 2018 draft legislation delegated regulatory 
oversight to the DOJ, other federal agencies—such as the CFTC—could also be 
possibilities. For a recent such proposal, see David Aron & Alexander Kane, 
Federal Regulation Could Sweeten the Sports Betting Pot, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 
2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-federal-regulation-
could-sweeten-the-sports-betting-pot. 
94  Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018). 
The reference to the 2024 date in the draft bill represented a sunset provision, 
which may have been included in an attempt to satisfy the “limited Times” 
requirement in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause. 
95  Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179 (1999). 
96  Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Asst. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph 
R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Sept. 24, 1991) (on 
file with author). 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 25 
upon sporting events.”97  
Such sentiments reinforce how potentially problematic it would be if federal 
legislation was passed bent on usurping or overriding existing state statues.98 
This is particularly relevant in the current environment where no fewer than 19 
states—as of June 20, 2020—have enacted legislation following the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 ruling.99 Likewise, there are a multitude of state laws still on the 
books across the country with differing definitions of what constitutes 
gambling.100 These factors make a one-size-fits-all federal approach difficult.  
 
B. Statutory 
 
a. Antitrust 
 
Antitrust laws serve as a “safeguard for the Nation’s free market 
structures.”101 Such laws, including the Sherman Act,102 prohibit “cartels, price 
fixing, and other combinations or practices that undermine the free market.”103 
In 2010, the Supreme Court—in American Needle v. NFL104—provided a primer 
on the reach of the Sherman Act: 
The meaning of the term “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy” is 
informed by the basic distinction in the Sherman Act between 
concerted and independent action that distinguishes § 1 of the Sherman 
 
97  Id. 
98  Beyond preemption, issues also arise if any forthcoming federal legislation 
included one or more grandfather clauses for certain (or all) states. For a discussion 
of sports gaming regulation vis-à-vis grandfather clauses in the context of PASPA, 
see John T. Holden, et al., Sports Gambling Regulation and Your Grandfather 
(Clause), 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1 (2014). 
99  Ryan Rodenberg, Over a Third of the U.S. Can Legally Bet on Sports: Here’s an 
Updated Map, ESPN (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29170044/over-third-us-legally-bet-sports-
here-updated-map.  
100  Ryan Rodenberg, Why Do States Define Gambling Differently? ESPN (Feb. 18, 
2016), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799507/daily-fantasy-why-do-
states-define-gambling-differently. With many states having statutes that turn on 
relative levels of skill and chance involved, there have been a variety of legal 
arguments about where sports betting falls on the skill-chance spectrum. For 
example, see Ryan Rodenberg, Documents Show DOJ, NFL Have Argued that 
Sports Betting is Skill-Based, ESPN (Jul. 16, 2015), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13268458/documents-show-justice-
department-nfl-argued-skill-sports-betting.  
101  N.C. State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1109 
(2015). 
102  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
103  N.C. State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S.Ct. at 1109. 
104  American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190-91 (2010). 
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Act from § 2. Section 1 applies only to concerted action that restrains 
trade. Section 2, by contrast, covers both concerted and independent 
action, but only if that action “monopolize[s],” 15 U.S.C. § 2, or 
“threatens actual monopolization,” a category that is narrower than 
restraint of trade. Monopoly power may be equally harmful whether it 
is the product of joint action or individual action. Thus, in § 1 
Congress “treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral 
behavior.” This is so because unlike independent action, “[c]oncerted 
activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk” insofar as it 
“deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking 
that competition assumes and demands.” For these reasons, § 1 
prohibits any concerted action “in restraint of trade or commerce,” 
even if the action does not “threate[n] monopolization,” ibid. And 
therefore, an arrangement must embody concerted action in order to be 
a “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy” under § 1. We have long 
held that concerted action under § 1 does not turn simply on whether 
the parties involved are legally distinct entities. Instead, we have 
eschewed such formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional 
consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct actually operate. As a result, we have 
repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity 
violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors 
and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.105 
 
Antitrust concerns in the burgeoning sports gaming data market are 
commonplace.106 According to an executive from William Hill:   
 
105  Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). In a footnote, the Supreme Court also 
made an observation germane to the pooling of purported sports gaming ‘data 
rights:’ “In any event, it simply is not apparent that the alleged conduct was 
necessary at all. Although two teams are needed to play a football game, not all 
aspects of elaborate interleague cooperation are necessary to produce a game. 
Moreover, even if league wide agreements are necessary to produce football, it 
does not follow that concerted activity in marketing intellectual property is 
necessary to produce football.” Id. at 214, n. 7. 
106  For media coverage of the issue, see Matt Rybaltowski, Tempers Flare at Panel 
on Official Sports Betting Data Requirements, SPORTS HANDLE (May 17, 2019), 
https://sportshandle.com/official-data-conference-panel/; James Kilsby, Battle Over 
Official Data Being Fought on Many Fronts, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (May 21, 
2019), https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/battle-
over-official-data-being-fought-many-fronts; Regina Garcia, NBA, MLB Using 
Data to Chase Better Deals with Sportsbooks, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 8, 2019) 
https://apnews.com/fe1cb6a75efe4f77be41ec6ff8664069; Matt Rybaltowski, As 
States Consider Anti-Courtsiding Measures, Debate on Transmission of Live Data 
Intensifies, SPORTS HANDLE (Jul. 10, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/state-anti-
courtsiding-measures/; Matt Carey, U.S. Sports Leagues Continue to Push Official 
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A final related policy concern involves the inclusion of a requirement 
to purchase what sports leagues have deemed ‘official league data.’ 
Mandating the use of ‘official league data’ just results in monopoly 
pricing power for the professional sports leagues. Federal courts have 
rejected the assertion that professional sports leagues have any 
intellectual property rights to data, further ruling that it is public 
information. This is simply an attempt by professional sports leagues 
to legislate what courts have rejected for decades.107  
 
According the media reports, the issue arose in the context of a 2018 
Connecticut legislative hearing too: 
 
Rep. Craig Fishbein noted that this [sports betting data] requirement 
gives the leagues exclusivity in the space. “Wouldn’t that be allowing 
the private monopoly of data?” [Fishbein] asked. [Major League 
Baseball executive Bryan] Seeley confirmed, though he tried to frame 
the request. “This is driven from consumer concerns, not money 
concerns,” [Seeley] said. “But I understand.” [Seeley] argued that 
illegal bookmakers have monopolies on their data, too. Fishbein 
suggested letting the market dictate which stat[istics] providers are 
best.108 
 
Restraints of trade alleged to be in violation of the antitrust laws—such as 
horizontal/vertical price fixing arrangements, output restrictions, and market 
divisions outside the sports context—are sometimes considered per se 
unreasonable, but the ‘rule of reason’ test is most commonly applied in the sports 
industry given the unique aspects of sports whereby they “can only be carried 
out jointly.”109 Under the rule of reason test, the Supreme Court examines “the 
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it 
was imposed.”110 Among other things, plaintiffs must identify an injury that is 
 
Data, but Operators Balk at Cost, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/us-sports-
leagues-continue-push-official-data-operators-balk-cost; Matt Rybaltowski, 
Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding Nevada Sportsbooks Pay More or Get 
Cut Off, SPORTS HANDLE (May 2, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-
demands-data-fee-nv-sportsbooks/.  
107  Sports Betting with a Mobile Component in New York State: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Racing, Gaming, and Wagering (2019) (statement of Danielle Boyd, 
William Will executive). 
108  Eric Ramsey, Connecticut Lawmakers Not Interested in ‘Lining The Pockets’ 
Of NBA, MLB Through Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 2, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/18812/connecticut-hearing-on-sports-betting/. 
109  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). 
110  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1365 (1978). 
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“attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.”111 For 
example, in the case of a horizontal agreement between competitors—such as 
teams in a sports league—the injury requirement can be shown in at least three 
ways: (i) a reduction in competitors’ decision-making about “whether and how 
often to offer to provide services;”112 (ii) a demonstrated fixing of prices;113 or 
(iii) a limitations on competitors “freedom to compete.”114 Vertical arrangements 
can give rise to antitrust issues too, provided the plaintiffs have standing under 
the Supreme Court’s ‘indirect purchaser’ rule.115 
Among states that have laws requiring licensed operators to use so-called 
‘official data’ for certain types of bets,116 the statutory language is largely 
uniform: such data must be purchased from a sports league or the league’s 
designee(s). The latter arrangement—where mandatory data dissemination is 
facilitated by one or more designees—could plausibly be described as joint 
venture. Indeed, in many cases, sports leagues and individual team owners are 
equity investors in the data dissemination firms.117 To the extent that contractual 
arrangements in the sports gaming data dissemination space amount to joint 
ventures, the Supreme Court has set forth guidelines for antitrust scrutiny. In 
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, for example, the Court applied the rule of reason to joint 
ventures and required plaintiffs to “demonstrate that a particular contract or 
combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found 
unlawful.”118 Specifically, “if the joint venture restricts price or output, the rule 
of reason test generally applies.”119  
In addition to joint ventures, antitrust scrutiny also extends to tying 
 
111  Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1889 (1990). 
112  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 774 
(1990). 
113  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, Co., 60 S.Ct. 811, 844 (1940). 
114  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 106 (1984). 
115  Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2074-75 (1977). 
116  As of June 20, 2020, such states included Tennessee, Michigan, and Illinois. As 
of July 1, 2020, Virginia will move into the same category too. 
117  See Daniel Kaplan & Eric Fisher, NFL Buys Stake in Stats Firm: Europe’s 
Sportradar Will Replace Stats LLC, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/04/20/Leagues-and-
Governing-Bodies/NFL-sportradar.aspx. See also Scott Soshnick, Jordan, Cuban, 
Leonsis Put Millions on Sports Betting’s Future, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-27/jordan-cuban-leonsis-put-
millions-on-sports-betting-s-future. 
118  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006).  
119  Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 99 S.Ct. 1551, 1564 (1979) 
(“Not all arrangements among actual potential competitors that have an impact on 
price are per se violations of the Sherman Act…[j]oint ventures and other 
cooperative arrangements are also not statutorily unlawful, at least not as price-
fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at 
all.”). 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 29 
arrangements that could fix prices or limit market entry. A tying arrangement 
usually occurs when “a seller of two separate products refuses to sell one unless 
the buyer also takes the other, either simultaneously or else as aftermarket 
purchases.”120 Put another way, a tie results if a consumer is only allowed to 
purchase one item from a company (which the consumer wants) if the consumer 
also agrees to purchase another item (which the consumer does not want) from 
the same company.121 The antitrust harm from tying takes two forms: 
“Foreclosure occurs when a tie ousts or unreasonably limits the opportunities of 
rivals, typically in the tied product…[t]he second type of antitrust harm is 
extraction, which involves overcharges that purchasers of tied packages are 
forced to pay.”122 
Antitrust concerns are central in cases when active market participants play 
a role in the regulatory process. The Supreme Court has found that “prohibitions 
against anti-competitive self-regulation by active market participants are an 
axiom of federal antitrust policy.”123 Similarly, Justice Stevens, dissenting in a 
different case, posited that “[t]he risk that private regulation of market entry, 
prices, or output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on members of an 
industry at the expense of the consuming public has been the central concern 
of…our antitrust jurisprudence.”124 
The restrictive and intertwined nature of the sports gaming data market lends 
itself to antitrust scrutiny. A variety of different plaintiffs—government or 
private—could bring a host of different claims and a number of different theories. 
Beyond antitrust prosecution by the DOJ or one or more state attorneys general, 
other potential plaintiffs could initiate a lawsuit, including consumers, sports 
gaming operators, or aggrieved data dissemination firms locked out of the market 
due to exclusive arrangements or restrictive access policies. Likewise, if sports 
leagues or players unions moved to unilaterally adopt certain data policies, 
indoor team owners or players could challenge such moves on antitrust grounds 
or otherwise.125 
 
b. Statutory Data Monopolies and the State-Action Antitrust Exemption 
 
The doctrine of state-action antitrust immunity found its genesis in the 
 
120  Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Nonexcluding Ties U. IOWA C. OF L. (2012).  
121  Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theorm, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 466-67 (2009) (discussing price 
squeezing on two products).  
122  Erik Hovenkamp &Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust 
Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 927 (2010). 
123  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 494 (2015). 
124  Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 2003 (1984) (J. Stevens dissenting). 
125  For an example of a team owner seeking to opt-out of a league-wide 
commercial arrangement, see NFL Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cowboys Football 
Club, Ltd. 922 F.Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
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Supreme Court’s Parker v. Brown decision.126 There, the Court held that the 
federal antitrust laws may not bar states from imposing market restrains because 
“‘nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history’ suggested that 
Congress intended to restrict the sovereign capacity of the States to regulate their 
economies.”127 While the Sherman Act “serves to promote robust 
competition”128 nationwide, states sometimes “impose restrictions on 
occupations, confer exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise 
limit competition to achieve public objectives.”129 However, if all state activity 
in these realms resulted in antitrust liability, “federal antitrust law would impose 
an impermissible burden on the states’ power to regulate.”130 
Enter state-action antitrust immunity. The ‘burden’ recognized by the 
Supreme Court gave way to an interpretation of the antitrust laws that 
“confer[ed] immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the states when acting in 
the their sovereign capacity.”131 Such immunity “embod[ies] in the Sherman Act 
the federalism principle that the states possess a significant measure of 
sovereignty under our Constitution.”132 However, a finding of state-action 
antitrust immunity is generally “disfavored.”133 
The difficult application of this principle occurs when “a state delegates 
 
126  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 307, 314 (1943). A related concept—particularly if 
there is ever a federal regulatory effort in the context of sports gaming data—is the 
extent to which the doctrine of implied antitrust immunity potentially attaches. The 
Supreme Court concluded that “[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a 
regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of 
plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.” United States v. 
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 83 S. Ct. 1715, 1734 (1963). In recent years, the doctrine 
has “considerably evolved.”  Barak Orbach, The Implied Antitrust Immunity, (Ariz 
Legal Stud. Pub. Discussion Paper No. 14-16, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477137. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. 
Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2389, (2007) (“Where regulatory statutes are silent in 
respect to antitrust, …courts must determine whether, and in what respects, they 
implicitly preclude application of the antitrust laws. Those determinations may vary 
from statute to statute, depending upon the relation between the antitrust laws and 
the regulatory program set forth in the particular statute, and the relation of the 
specific conduct at issue to both sets of laws.”).  
127  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1010 
(2013) (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943)). 
128  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 
1109 (2015). 
129  Id.  
130  Id. at 1109 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978). 
131  Id. at 1110 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943)). 
132  Community Commun. Co. v. Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 842 (1982). 
133  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S.Ct. 2169, 2178 (1992). 
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control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” like a regulatory board.134 In such 
cases, the Supreme Court has enunciated a two-part test, recognizing that 
“‘[c]loser analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of” 
the state itself, but rather ‘is carried out by others pursuant to state 
authorization.’”135 Namely, “a non-sovereign actor controlled by active market 
participants—such as [a B]oard—enjoys Parker immunity only if it satisfies two 
requirements: first that the ‘challenged restraint…be one clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy,’ and second that the ‘the policy…be 
actively supervised by the state.’”136 This dual test derives from a recognition 
that:  
 
Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the state 
seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants, for 
established ethical standards may blend with private anticompetitive 
motives in a way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual 
allegiances are not always apparent to an actor. In consequence, active 
market participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets 
free from antitrust accountability.137 
 
Passing the two-part test represents a high hurdle for states looking for 
immunity to attach. To satisfy the ‘clear articulation’ prong, “the displacement 
of competition [must be] the ‘inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise 
of authority delegated by the state legislature. In that scenario, the state must 
have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent 
with its policy goals.’”138 The ‘active supervision’ requirement mandates “that 
state officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts 
of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.”139  
Among the states that have already enacted an ‘official data’ statutory 
mandate, there is scant evidence that lawmakers in Tennessee, Michigan, or 
Illinois have enunciated why—or how—such a data law is consistent with state 
 
134  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 
1110 (2015). 
135  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1010 
(2013) (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)). 
136  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 
1110 (2015) (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 115 (1980)). 
137   Id. at 1111 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (“The national policy in favor of 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting [a] gauzy cloak of state involvement 
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement”). 
138  Id. at 1112 (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (2013)).  
139  Id. (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). 
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policy. Beyond effective lobbying by industry stakeholders with a pecuniary 
incentive to pursue such a statutory mandate, the policy-enhancing motivation is 
dubious. As such, supporters of the laws may have difficulty arguing that the 
restraints are clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy. 
Shifting regulatory standards for what constitutes ‘commercially reasonable’ 
pricing and deference to industry stakeholders may doom such laws under the 
second Parker prong. Active state supervision is required, which is a high 
standard to meet when the underlying regulations look to industry-tethered 
metrics and off-loaded boards comprised of private sector industry employees, 
as is the case in Tennessee.  
 
2. Constitutional 
 
Several constitutional provisions impact the regulatory treatment of sports 
gaming data, especially if any sui generis property right were to attach.140 Article 
I’s Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress the authority: “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”141 The Supreme Court has set forth general parameters on the 
power of Congress to grant monopolies such as an ‘official data’ requirement for 
sports gaming. According to the Court: “The monopoly privileges that Congress 
may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit…[it] is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors.”142  
Prominent scholars agree: “[a] corollary principle [of the Intellectual 
Property Clause] demands that Congress initially direct exclusive grants to those 
who provide the public with the new creation. Monopolies are not rewards 
Congress may grant to favored special-interest groups.”143 Another scholar 
concurred: “The overwhelming view among commentators is that the Intellectual 
Property Clause’s limits apply to all of Congress’s powers and therefore that 
Congress may not look to other Article I, Section 8 powers in order to avoid 
 
140  Whether there is a constitutional right to advertise about sports gaming options 
is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 
509 U.S. 418 (1993). Likewise, whether there is a constitutional right to bet on 
sports is outside the scope of this paper. See generally Dustin Gouker, An NFL 
Team Wants You to Vote to ‘Protect Your Right to Legally Bet on Sports’, LEGAL 
SPORTS REPORT (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreports.com/25655/miami-
dolphins-plug-legal-sports-betting/.  
141  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
142  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
143  Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1119, 1164 (2000). 
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those limits.144 Indeed, the Intellectual Property Clause has anti-monopoly 
origins145 and its ‘promotion of progress’ requirement limits the power of 
Congress in the intellectual property realm.146  
A federal mandate that sports betting operators—as a condition of receiving 
and retaining a license—must use data purchased from a sports league or its 
designee can plausibly be described as the functional equivalent of a patent. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that Congress has limited patent powers given the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause: 
 
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. 
Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of 
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system 
which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress 
of…useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the 
Constitution and it may not be ignored.147  
 
Protecting sports gaming data via copyright—a topic that has indirectly 
already been litigated and is discussed elsewhere herein—is unlikely. In contrast 
to “live musicals, theatrical plays, and professional wrestling, honestly 
competitive sports are unscripted, making them incompatible with copyright 
law’s constitutional and statutory requirements.”148 The DOJ Solicitor General 
has cited live sports to illustrate the concept too: “In some circumstances, 
moreover, the initial ‘performance’ may be the act of transmission itself. For 
example, when a television network broadcasts a live sporting event, no 
underlying performance precedes the initial transmission—the telecast itself is 
 
144  Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 274 (2004). 
145  Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909 passim (2002) (Ochoa 
and Rose note that the Supreme Court rejected the possibility of a perpetual 
copyright via common law in an 1834 case). See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 
684–85 (1834). 
146  Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 
1771 passim (2006). 
147  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (emphasis 
omitted). 
148  Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., “Whose” Game Is It? Sports-Wagering and 
Intellectual Property, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1, 6 (2014). 
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the only copyrighted work.”149 Disparate court rulings about narrow, discrete 
issues in this space has seemingly resulted in an inter-circuit split between the 
Second Circuit150 and the Eleventh Circuit151 and a plausible intra-circuit split 
within the Eighth Circuit.152  
Beyond the Intellectual Property Clause, other constitutional concerns that 
could arise in the sports gaming data context include the Due Process Clause, 
Tenth Amendment, Takings Clause, and First Amendment. For example, a state 
challenging any new federal regulatory statute—upon establishing standing153—
could, among other claims, challenge the law on the same anti-commandeering 
grounds that New Jersey successfully argued in the context of PASPA. Likewise, 
if Nevada’s long-standing regulatory process were to be usurped by federal 
efforts, a Takings Clause claim could be triggered. 
 
a. Void-For-Vagueness 
 
The roots of the void-for-vagueness doctrine are firmly in the Due Process 
Clause.154 If a law is “so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain 
as to the conduct it prohibits,”155 then the statute does not provide fair notice as 
required by the Due Process Clause. Put another way, such a vague law lacks fair 
notice because “[it] leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally 
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.”156 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine could also attach if the law in question does not 
“establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement” and “encourage[s] 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”157 Courts have evaluated this test 
with an eye towards whether police would, or could, enforce the law.158 If 
 
149  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am. 
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (No. 13-461) (citing NBA v. 
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846-847 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
150  See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997). 
151  See Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1296, 1298 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
152  See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007); see also NFL v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 
732 (8th Cir. 1986). For further discussion, see Rodenberg, supra note 148, at 6. 
153  Ryan M. Rodenberg, ‘Standing’ Up for State Rights in Sports Betting, 30 J. 
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 142, passim (2020). 
154  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 
155  Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 
377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey 306 U.S. 451, 453, (1939)). See 
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595(2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)). 
156  Giaccio, 382 U.S.at 402–03 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964); 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey 306 U.S. 451, 453, (1939)). 
157  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983). 
158  Id. at 358. 
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determined to be unconstitutionally vague, a court would then construe the law 
narrowly to avoid the vagueness or invalidate the entire statute.159 
Although the void-for-vagueness standard is most commonly at play in 
criminal law, it also applies to civil statutes.160 However, the Supreme Court has 
found that “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution [allows]…depends in 
part on the nature of the enactment…express[ing] greater tolerance of 
enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of 
imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”161 Lesser scrutiny has been found 
appropriate for economic regulatory laws “because its subject matter is often 
more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan 
behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of 
action.”162 That notwithstanding, if the economic regulatory law threatens a 
constitutional right, such as free speech under the First Amendment, “a more 
stringent vagueness test should apply.”163 
Statutory ‘official data’ mandates with or without ‘commercially reasonable’ 
standards in sports gaming legislation are close cousins to excessive-price 
lawmaking in other contexts, such as prescription drugs.164 Two regulatory 
moves in the realm of sports gaming data are susceptible to the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. First, any statutory mandate—at the state or federal level—
requiring operators to purchase so-called ‘official data’ from a designated seller 
or sellers is clouded by precedent concluding that such information is (already) 
in the public domain and unowned. Second, some states have attached a 
‘commercially reasonable’ standard to the prices of such mandates. In so doing, 
the states are, paradoxically and nonsensically, trying to attach a price to 
something that has no definitive owner. 
First Amendment overbreadth is a cousin of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has found that “[t]he Constitution gives significant 
protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment’s 
vast and privileged sphere.”165 In First Amendment cases, statutes can be 
invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are 
 
159  See City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 61–64 (1999). 
160  Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018). 
161  Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–
99 (1982) (footnotes omitted). 
162  Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted). 
163  Id. at 499; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253–54 
(2012) (“When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those [vagueness] 
requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected 
speech.”). 
164  See Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in 
“Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. L. REV. 859 passim 
(2020) (discussing unconscionable drug prices in the context of the Due Process 
Clause).  
165  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). 
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unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”166 
Given the possibility of a chilling effect, a person whose activity is unprotected 
may have standing to challenge a law as overbroad under the First 
Amendment.167 Any state law purporting to restrict the ability of individuals to 
transmit news and information from a sports venue—such as the score of the 
underlying game—is vulnerable to invalidation under a First Amendment 
overbreadth claim due to the vast net cast by such a law.  
 
b. First Amendment and Prior Restraints 
 
Any government-mandated restrictions on the dissemination of news and 
information—such as via statutory ‘official data’ requirements in the sports 
gaming realm—invites scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has found “speech on public issues…is entitled to special protection.”168 Snyder 
v. Phelps detailed when such protection attaches: “Speech deals with matters of 
public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of 
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and 
concern to the public.’”169 In a recent court filing, two sports industry 
stakeholders explained how sports satisfy Snyder’s defendant-friendly two-part 
test: “Courts broadly construe ‘matters of public concern’ to encompass news 
reports about all manner of subjects of interest to substantial portions of the 
public, including news about sports and entertainment.”170  
 
Relatedly, sports league executives have described sports in a similar way. 
In a 2012 deposition, MLB executive Bud Selig described pro baseball as a 
“quasi-public institution.”171 In a 2018 submission for a Congressional hearing, 
NFL executive Jocelyn Moore referenced “our nation’s professional and amateur 
 
166  United States. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n.6 (2008)). 
167  N. Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982). 
168  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). 
169  Id. at 453 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; City of San Diego, Cal. V. Roe, 
543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2011)). 
170  Brief for Fox Broad. Co. & Big Ten Network, LLC as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendant NCAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F.Supp.3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(No. C 09-1967 CW) (citing Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
171  Deposition of Allan H. Selig at 10, NCAA v. Christie 926 F.Supp.2d 551 (D. 
NJ 2013) (No. 12–4947) (“…baseball is a social institution. I believe that. I also 
believe it’s a quasi-public institution. But it’s a social institution with really 
important social responsibility.”) (on file with author). 
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sporting contests.”172 A leading scholar has found that courts are adverse to 
limiting the dissemination of information if involving a public concern, even if 
having commercial value.173 Indeed, “[a]n individual’s right to speak is 
implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on the 
way in which information might be used’ or disseminated.”174 
Application of the First Amendment is also shaped by the state action 
doctrine, requiring a government actor to be involved. Specifically, “the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state action, not on action by the 
owner of private property used only for private purposes.”175 Put another way, 
the First Amendment’s free speech clause “prohibits only governmental 
abridgment of speech…[and]…does not prohibit private abridgment of 
speech.”176 In deducing the divide between public and private action, the 
Supreme Court has concluded: “we say that state action may be found if, though 
only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ 
that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.’”177 While some sports venues in the United States are privately owned, 
most are on public land or take place in publicly-financed stadiums. Enforcement 
of any ‘official data’ mandates on-site would likely be left to private security 
forces or duly-authorized law enforcement officials. 
Dissemination of news and information—whether related to sports gaming 
or not—occurring on public land and involving a state actor almost certainly 
triggers the First Amendment. First Amendment coverage on private land with 
no state action is less certain, given that private property does not “lose its private 
character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes.”178 In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court left 
open the possibility that private landowners’ right to suppress free speech had 
limits.179 In either case, a sports gaming data disseminator could adopt an 
offensive litigation strategy and preemptively seek to have any state or federal 
 
172  Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing on RHOB 
2141 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1(2018) (statement 
of Jocelyn Moore, Exec. Vice President, Commc’ns and Pub. Affairs, NFL). 
173  Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: 
Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
665, 667 (1992).  
174  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011) (quoting Seattle Times 
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)). 
175  Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972); see also Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982). 
176  Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). 
177  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 
(2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).  
178  Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972). 
179  PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77 (1980). 
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‘official data’ mandate declared to be an unconstitutional prior restraint or, more 
generally, file for a declaratory judgment about ownership of real-time data 
involving sporting events.180 
 
The content of the involved speech and its classification also plays a role in 
any First Amendment analysis. Certain speech—such as incitement of 
lawlessness, defamation, and obscenity—fall into a category of unprotected 
speech.181 Speech in support of a commercial venture has been extended First 
Amendment protection if it meets the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson four-part 
test: 
 
[I]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activity, the government's power is more 
circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the 
regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The 
limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve 
the State’s goal.182  
 
Speech involving cultural, social, or political discourse is fully protected 
under the First Amendment,183 with multiple courts extending such protection to 
entertainment-related news.184 The Supreme Court has found that this extends to 
newsworthy items in literary works: “[t]he news element—the information 
respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the creation 
of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the 
history of the day.”185 Free speech rights vis-à-vis real-time news has also been 
addressed at the appellate court level, with the Second Circuit concluding that 
the right to “make news…does not give rise to a right for [an entity] to control 
who breaks that news and how.”186 
 
180  See generally NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating 
the Second Circuit’s conclusion that a live sporting event, on its own, does not 
constitute an “original work of authorship” under copyright law). 
181  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–246 (2002) (citing Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 
(1991)). 
182  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
564 (1980). 
183  Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
184  Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500–02 (1952); Winters v. N.Y., 
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
185  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) 
(quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918)). 
186  Barclays Capital Inc. v. TheFlyontheWall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 907 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 39 
In any pre-enforcement ‘as applied’ First Amendment challenge involving 
statutory mandates regarding sports gaming data, the plaintiff would first need 
to establish Article III standing.187 Upon a finding of standing, any case brought 
by a disfavored data disseminator or sports gaming operator would turn to the 
merits; namely, whether a federal or state mandate restricting the distribution of 
news and information relevant to sports gaming complies with the First 
Amendment. Similarly, if any such mandate represents a prior restraint, there is 
a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”188 Prior restraints, the 
Supreme Court has found, represent “the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights.”189  
The First Amendment generally stands for the proposition that “government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”190 The right to publish truthful information of a public 
concern is one of the “core purposes” of the First Amendment flagged by the 
Supreme Court.191 Regulations based on content are “presumptively invalid,” 
with the “Government bear[ing] the burden to rebut that presumption.”192 When 
government regulations restrict certain content—such as live scores being 
disseminated on-site at a sporting event—a court evaluating the permissibility of 
such restrictions must determine whether to apply strict scrutiny or intermediate 
scrutiny.193 If a strict scrutiny standard were to attach, any statutory sports 
gaming data mandate would only be upheld if “it is justified by a compelling 
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”194 The 
Supreme Court’s intermediate scrutiny standard makes content restrictions 
permissible only when narrowly drawn and in furtherance of a substantial 
government interest.195 Whether there is a compelling or substantial government 
interest in restricting sports gaming news and information is dubious.  
Although the Second Circuit ultimately did not reach the issue in NBA v. 
Motorola,196 First Amendment issues were briefed extensively by the parties and 
amici. For example, amici New York Times emphasized the importance of the 
 
187  The Supreme Court has set forth a multi-pronged test to satisfy Article III’s 
standing requirement. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); 
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
188  Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). 
189  Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
190  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). 
191  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). 
192  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). 
193  The Ninth Circuit recently applied strict scrutiny to a content-based restriction 
on speech. See IMDb.com Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F. 3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2020). 
194  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). 
195  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
196  NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 854 n.10 (1997) (“In view of our 
disposition of this matter [on alternative grounds], we need not address 
[defendants’] First Amendment and laches defenses.”).  
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case:  
 
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech and a free press are neither limited nor 
enhanced by economic considerations. See, e.g., New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). It is similarly beyond question that 
real-time sports scores, particularly in widely popular professional 
NBA basketball games, constitute news entitled to First Amendment 
protection and status. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (“There is no doubt that entertainment, 
as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that 
entertainment can itself be important news.”); Kregos v. Associated 
Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)… 
 
That the NBA undeniably stages and sponsors the sports events which 
are the subject of legitimate news coverage does not give it a 
proprietary interest in information about the event itself. The NBA’s 
position that it could restrain the [New York] Times from reporting 
about its games more frequently than it wishes because that privilege is 
supposedly the NBA’s ‘private property’ cannot be the case any more 
than that the NBA can require the [New York] Times to report on its 
games in the way it chooses. Contrary to the lower court’s analysis, the 
First Amendment does not condition the right to collect and 
disseminate facts to the public upon a publisher’s willingness or ability 
to pay for news… 
 
Here there can be no question but that the relating of scores of NBA 
basketball games are news reports. The NBA certainly considers its 
games as news, and the media have traditionally considered them as 
such. Key to news is the proposition that the outcome is 
unknown…Unlike a play or concert to which the NBA tries to 
analogize its games, there is no script; the story line does not stay the 
same…[T]he outcome of NBA games is never known in advance, and 
hence the results and even the running score, are archetypically 
news… 
 
In a sense, the NBA’s misconception stems from an unfounded view of 
its ‘property.’ True, the NBA pays for the staging of its contents. True, 
business realities appear to have influenced courts to allow sports 
organizers to exploit, on an exclusive basis, the actual television (and 
radio) transcriptions of the game. However, the NBA does not own, for 
itself to license, the information stemming from its contests. Those 
facts are news, and are not part of the proprietary ownership which the 
NBA can maintain for commercial exploitation -- either during game 
time or after the final buzzer has sounded… 
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The data, statistics, and score of an NBA game are imbued with no 
more proprietary interest than any other news of the day. It is well 
settled that statistics of sports events cannot by copyrighted.197  
 
Some state statutes have entertained the possibility of a ‘bubble zone’ in and 
near sports stadiums to restrict betting and the dissemination of sports gaming 
news and information. While the Supreme Court has upheld such a bubble zone 
near a health care facility under the First Amendment,198 subsequent rulings have 
called into question the permissibility of such zones moving forward.199 
Lobbying has ensued regardless. In 2019, a law firm representing the “Chicago 
Bears, Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, and the United Center Joint Venture 
(which is the home venue for the Chicago Bulls and Chicago Blackhawks)” sent 
a nine-page letter to the Illinois Gaming Board and told the board that:200 
 
 
 
Whether a zone of exclusivity is enforceable vis-à-vis the First Amendment 
could be resolved if regulations in Indiana, Washington, DC, and elsewhere 
focused on the “method of data collection” are litigated.201 There are other 
 
197  Brief for N. Y. Times Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–9, 14 
n.6, 19, 20, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 96-7975, 96-7983, 96-9123, (2d Cir. Sept. 
23, 1996) (some internal citations omitted) (quoting American Broadcasting Cos., 
Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)) (“once there is a pubic 
function, and participation by some of the media, the First Amendment requires 
equal access to all of the media or the rights of the First Amendment would no 
longer be tenable.”). 
198  Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
199  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2229 (2015); McCullen v. 
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
200  Letter from Donna B. More, Fox Rothschild LLP, to Marcus Fruchter, Admin., 
Ill. Gaming Bd. (Sept. 27, 2019) (on file with author). 
201  Matt Carey, Recent Regulations Show How Official Data Debate Evolving, 
GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Sept. 12, 2019), 
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examples too. Regulations in Iowa require licensed operators to disclose data 
sources.202 In Michigan, a law includes a provision that “would bar operators 
from using data that was obtained from live event attendees who are collecting 
the data in violation of the event’s terms of admittance, also known as ‘scouting’ 
or ‘courtsiding.’”203 The following was included in a draft New York bill: 
 
Persons who present sporting contests shall have authority to remove 
spectators and others from any facility for violation of any applicable 
codes of conduct, and to deny persons access to all facilities they 
control, to revoke season tickets or comparable licenses, and to share 
information about such persons with others who present sporting 
contests and with the appropriate jurisdictions’ law enforcement 
authorities. 204 
 
c. Piracy, Public Domain Facts, and Data(base) Rights 
 
After the Supreme Court sports betting case was decided on May 14, 2018, 
various sports leagues started using the word ‘piracy’ in lobbying efforts and 
speaking points when talking to the press.205 The shift was reminiscent of how 
amici National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) described the underlying 
conduct in the NBA v. Motorola litigation twenty-plus years earlier: 
 
Appellants’ real-time, running accounts of a basketball game constitute 
the on-line equivalent of a play-by-play radio broadcast that is clearly 
protected under the law. A stream of detailed, real-time reports that 
include the score, the time remaining and players’ fouls is a running 
 
https://stage.gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/recent-
regulations-show-how-official-data-debate-evolving. 
202  Id.  
203  Id. (“It would further prohibit the use of scraped data obtained from ‘automated 
computer programs that compile data from the internet in violation of the terms of 
service of the relevant website or other internet platform.’”). 
204  Matt Rybaltowski, As States Consider Anti-Courtsiding Measures, Debate on 
Transmission of Live Data Intensifies, SPORTS HANDLE (July 10, 2019), 
https://sportshandle.com/state-anti-courtsiding-measures/. 
205  Matt Rybaltowski, PGA Tour Mindful of Data Piracy Risks as Launch of Shot-
by-Shot Betting Nears, SPORTS HANDLE (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://sportshandle.com/pga-tour-data-shot-by-shot/ (In 2019, an entity calling 
itself “The Sports Coalition” sent a three-page letter to the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative describing how its members—a group purportedly 
including MLB, NBA, NCAA, NFL, NHL, and USTA—“are heavily affected by 
live sports telecast piracy, including the unauthorized live retransmission of sports 
telecasts over the Internet.”); Letter from Michael J. Mellis, EVP & Gen. Couns., 
MLB to Sung Chang, Dir. for Innovation & Intell. Prop., Off. of U.S. Trade Rep. 
(Feb. 9, 2019) (on file with author). 
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depiction of the game, the essence of the commercial product created 
by the NBA. This is not the simple reporting of statistics or the bare 
facts of a game, as appellants now strain to suggest. Appellants 
provide unauthorized means of following a game in progress, 
continuously and contemporaneously. This constitutes 
misappropriation akin to an authorized radio play-by-play description 
of the game delivered by a fan with a microphone at his seat, or an 
unauthorized broadcast by a fan with a video camera. Appellants have 
misappropriated property to which that have no rights.206 
 
Whether information can be owned has long been analyzed.207 Whether 
news can be owned has been debated and litigated for even longer. Issues related 
to piracy have persisted for centuries too.208 Author Will Slauter described a 
“culture of copying” in 18th century Britain and “cutting and pasting” in the 
United States during the 1700s.209 Slauter provided an early example: 
 
In 1733, a London paper called the Grub-Street Journal was accused 
of ‘piracy.’ The offense? Each week’s issue contained a digest of news 
compiled from eight to ten other London papers. The editor would read 
these papers looking for different accounts of the same event and then 
reproduce short excerpts one after the other, always indicating the 
source.210  
 
Two court rulings in the United States—one in 1918 and the other in 1921—
shaped the issue for decades later. In 1918, the Supreme Court recognized a 
“quasi property” right in time-sensitive news that was untethered to copyright.211 
 
206  Brief for NBC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 8, NBA v. Motorola, 
Inc. (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 1996). 
207  ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO 
PUBLIC ACCESS 174 (1994). 
208  ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM 
GUTENBERG TO GATES 328 (2009). 
209  WILL SLAUTER, WHO OWNS THE NEWS?: A HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 51, 
87 (2019). 
210  Id. at 1. 
211  Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Eleven years later, a Second 
Circuit ruling cast doubt on whether a court, as opposed to Congress, could create 
such a common law property right. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 
280 (2d Cir. 1929). For a detailed account of the Supreme Court’s INS v. AP ruling, 
see VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, HOT NEWS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: A LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2015). For example, Ekstrand expertly reveals the origins of phrases such as 
“reaping where one has not sown” and “parasite” in a 1902 Seventh Circuit case. 
Id. at 56 (citing Nat’l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (7th 
Cir. 1902)). 
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Three years later, the Seventh Circuit concluded that formatted news articles 
were eligible for copyright protection and could be infringed.212 Evolving 
technology—first radio and then television—gave rise to a host of 
misappropriation court cases. Researcher Victoria Smith Ekstrand tracked such 
cases and detailed special concerns when sporting events were (re-)broadcast: 
 
In twenty-five misappropriation decisions from 1930 through 1959, 
sixteen involved the piracy of radio signals or the piracy of sound 
recordings or live radio performances. Plaintiffs in thirteen of those 
sixteen decisions were successful making a claim of misappropriation. 
These misappropriation cases typically involved the reading of printed 
news from a newspaper on the air, the rebroadcast or recording of live 
radio performances, and the reuse of live radio descriptions of sporting 
events, such as baseball games. 
 
The unique character of sports events—live unscripted action made 
available to the public by private organizations—combined with the 
new medium of radio to bring sports to many more fans. But the nature 
of such events on radio also created many more opportunities for 
others to use or pirate parts of the broadcast left unprotected by 
copyright. Such actions infuriated private sports organization and their 
owners who financed and ran such events. Most courts were 
sympathetic to such misappropriation actions and in their decisions, 
found it easy to apply elements of misappropriation.213   
 
According to Ekstrand, one boxing case involved a defendant who used 
“newsgathering representatives…located at vantage points outside the stadium 
but within view of the bout.”214 Another lawsuit included allegations that a 
defendant “obtained live reports of the games by stationing reporters at vantage 
points above the walls…where the [Pittsburgh] Pirates played.”215 A third case 
involved a disfavored independent sports reporter who sent out play-by-play 
accounts of New York Giants baseball games.216 All three cases found that 
misappropriation had occurred and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Ekstrand 
determined that Loeb v. Turner217 was “[t]he only sports broadcast decision to 
reject a finding of misappropriation during this time.”218 The Loeb v. Turner 
court allowed a reporter, “who was stationed outside the racecar track,”219 to 
 
212  Chi. Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass’n, 275 F. 797, 798–99 (7th Cir. 1921). 
213  EKSTRAND, supra note 211, at 112–13, 120. 
214  Id. at 120. 
215  Id. at 121. 
216  Id. at 122. 
217  Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). 
218  EKSTRAND, supra note 211, at 123. 
219  Id. 
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broadcast his own depiction of the race gleaned by listening to another radio 
signal. The Loeb v. Turner court explained:  
 
The actual happenings of each day, including sporting events, become 
part of the facts of history immediately upon their happening. News of 
them cannot be copyrighted; nor, so far as the public is concerned, can 
the news itself become the subject of a property right belonging 
exclusively to any person. To hold otherwise would be to contravene 
our constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press.220  
 
Whether sports leagues and teams playing games in publicly-owned 
stadiums are state actors in the context of enforcing restrictions on the 
dissemination of sports gaming news and information is unsettled. No federal or 
state case has directly addressed the issue. However, the Supreme Court has 
found that public funding does not automatically attach state actor classification 
to a private entity,221 even if the entity is granted legal monopoly status.222  
In the years immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,223 Congress considered—but never 
passed—multiple bills that would provide protection for the commercial value 
of information databases.224 One such bill, the Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Congress, passed the House of Representatives 
on May 19, 1998 before dying in the Senate.225 The object of the bill was, “in 
effect, to provide a quasi-property right in certain collections of information that 
required great effort to compile.”226 The DOJ found that the bill “would provide 
what is known as ‘sweat of the brow’ protection for certain compilations of 
factual material.”227 
The DOJ noted multiple “constitutional concerns” stemming from the bill, 
including concerns related to the Intellectual Property Clause, Commerce 
 
220  Loeb, 257 S.W. at 802-03.  
221  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982). 
222  Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974). 
223  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
224  Samuel E. Trosow, Sui Generis Database Legislation: A Critical 
Analysis, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 534, 573 (2004). For details on how Congress 
created a sui generis property right in the context of computer chips, see Pamela 
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of 
the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471–86 (1986). 
225  Memorandum from William Treanor, Dep. Asst. Att’y Gen., to  William 
Marshall, Assoc. White House Counsel, on Constitutional Concerns Raised by the 
Collections of Info. Antipiracy Act 166 (July 28, 1998). 
226  Id. 
227  Id.  
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Clause, and First Amendment.228 For example, the DOJ wrote that “some 
language in Feist might also fairly be read to suggest…that the Intellectual 
Property Clause prohibits Congress from relying on any other constitutional 
power to afford copyright-like protection to facts and to the nonoriginal parts of 
factual compilations.”229 The DOJ also wrote: “Even if the Intellectual Property 
Clause does not itself impose constraints on Congress’s Commerce Clause 
Power, the First Amendment might nevertheless limit the type of protection that 
Congress can provide against the ‘use’ and ‘extraction’ of factual 
compilations.”230 
The DOJ’s First Amendment-related concern derived from multiple 
Supreme Court cases that have addressed related issues. The DOJ cited New York 
Times v. Sullivan for the proposition that “[o]ne of the principal aims of the First 
Amendment is to ‘secure the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources.’”231 Further, the DOJ cited several Supreme 
Court cases to emphasize that “the government may not generally restrict 
individuals from disclosing information that lawfully comes into their hands in 
the absence of a ‘state interest of the highest order.’”232 Finally, the DOJ looked 
to Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises to highlight the so-called 
idea/expression dichotomy, which “strike[s] a definitional balance between the 
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of 
facts while still protecting an author’s expression. No author may copyright his 
ideas or the facts he narrates.”233 The DOJ concluded: “[N]o intellectual property 
rights can extend to facts that have been released in the public domain.”234  
 
d. Misappropriation and Intellectual Property Preemption  
 
With some exceptions, intellectual property protection generally includes 
four categories—patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. The divide 
between ‘ideas’ and ‘expression’ permeates across intellectual property 
categories. The Supreme Court found that “‘[d]ue to this [idea/expression] 
distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly 
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication’; the author’s 
expression alone gains copyright protection.”235 Facts—such as phone numbers 
or perhaps the score of a basketball game as the game is being played—are 
 
228  Id. at 166–67. 
229  Id. at 178. 
230  Id. at 186. 
231  Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).  
232  Id. at 187 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605 (1995)).  
233  Id. at 188 (alteration in original) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
234  Id. 
235  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 219 (2003)). 
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almost certainly not eligible for intellectual property protection.  
Indeed, the most prominent Supreme Court case to date—Feist Publications 
v. Rural Telephone Services—considered whether phone numbers qualified for 
copyright protection.236 In a 9-0 ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to 
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.237’” The Court also made 
clear that “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement”238 and copyright 
protection only attaches if there is some “minimal level of creativity.”239 Further, 
the Court rejected the so-called ‘sweat of the brow’ theory involving 
compilations of fact-based news.240 In an explanation particularly relevant to 
sports gaming news and information, the Court also explained how facts should 
be positioned:  
 
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The 
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to 
find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has 
merely discovered its existence…The same is true of all facts—
scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. ‘[T]hey may 
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every 
person.’241   
 
Disputes over distribution rights outside the context of sports gaming data 
have persisted for over 130 years, with a range of precedent that has resulted in 
somewhat of a split between the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit.242 The 
Eighth Circuit also has a plausible intra-circuit split of authority.243 Rights 
 
236  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
237  Id. at 349 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154 
n.2 (1975)). Whether modern highly commercialized sports qualify as ‘useful Arts’ 
under the Constitution is an issue outside the scope of this paper, but worthy of 
further inquiry. 
238  Id. at 346. 
239  Id. at 358. 
240  Id. at 352–54, 359–60 (“originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone 
of copyright protection in fact-based works”). The ‘sweat of the brow’ theory is 
also sometimes referred to as ‘industrious collection.’ For details, see Craig Joyce 
& Tyler T. Ochoa, Reach Out and Touch Someone: Reflections on the 25th 
Anniversary of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 54(2) 
HOUSTON L. REV. 257 (2016). 
241  Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 347–48 (citing Miller v. Universal Studios, 650 F.2d 
1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
242  Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004); 
NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
243  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); NFL v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th 
Cir. 1986). 
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attached to news and information relevant in the sports gaming realm also arose 
in a district court decision within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit.244 A litany 
of other cases date back to the late 1800s.245 However, since the Supreme Court 
rejected the concept of federal common law in its 1938 Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins ruling,246 it generally falls to state common law to recognize a cause 
of action like misappropriation.247  
To date, courts have been unwilling to deem information—sports gaming-
related or otherwise—as intellectual property worthy of commercial 
protection.248 Indeed, “[a] fundamental principle of intellectual property is that 
no one should be given a monopoly on facts, ideas, or other building blocks of 
knowledge, thought, or communication.”249 Nevertheless, sports leagues and 
others have persisted in positing that a property right of sorts can attach to news 
emanating from the underlying games or contests. For example, in the early 
stages of the recent Supreme Court sports betting litigation, the DOJ took the 
position that PASPA granted sports leagues a quasi-property right. According to 
the DOJ:  
 
PASPA does give the leagues a protected legal interest that has been 
invaded by New Jersey’s authorization of sports gambling…the legal 
protection that PASPA accords to sports leagues is similar to the 
protections traditionally afforded in fields such as copyright and 
 
244  NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977). 
245  Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993); United States Golf 
Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 
1986); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D. 
Penn. 1938) (“[T]he plaintiffs and the defendant are using baseball news as 
material for profit…by reason of its creation of the game, its control of the park, 
and its restriction of the dissemination of news therefrom, [the Pittsburgh Athletic 
Company] has a property right in such news, and the right to control the use thereof 
for a reasonable time following the games”); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. 
v. Transradio Press Serv., Inc., 300 N.Y.S. 159, 165 Misc. 71 (1937); Detroit Base-
Ball v. Deppert, 27 N.W. 856 (Mich. 1886).  
246  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938). 
247  The continued vitality of state misappropriation laws was addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1971). Federal copyright 
laws were updated in 1976. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 301 (2018).  
248  Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: 
New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 129 
(1992).  
249  Julie E. Cohen & William M. Martin, Intellectual Property Rights in Data, in 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45, 51 (Deanna J. Richards, 
Braden R. Allenby, & W. Dale Compton, eds., 2001).  
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trademark law, where authors and companies are given the right not to 
have their creative works exploited by other parties.250 
 
Legal claims alleging misappropriation (or free-riding) typically arise when 
the plaintiff recognizes—explicitly or implicitly—that no intellectual property 
right exists.251 Also, misappropriation claims usually arise when two parties are 
in competition with each other and one is claiming theft of an intangible.252 
Although not narrowly focused on sports gaming data, there are three relatively 
recent federal appellate-level rulings that speak to legal claims centered on the 
commodification of real-time news and information.253 Taken together, the 
trilogy of cases254 provides a framework for evaluating misappropriation claims 
involving real-time sports gaming data.255  
 
250  Brief for Appellee at 17–22, NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
251  Michael E. Kenneally, Misappropriation and the Morality of Free-Riding, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 289 (2014). 
252  For a detailed discussion about whether the “misappropriation doctrine, if it is 
to be retained at all, should be federalized,” see Richard A. Posner, 
Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40(3) HOUSTON L. REV. 621, 640 (2003); see also 
Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury It 
or Revive It?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 781 (1994).  
253  In 2016, a district court judge in New York ruled against an event organizer 
who tried to restrict the dissemination of real-time chess moves. World Chess US, 
Inc. v. ChessGames Services LLC, No. 1:16-cv-08629-VM, 2016 WL 7190075, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016). 
254  Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 
2004); NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997); C.B.C. Distrib. & 
Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., , 505 F.3d 818 (8th 
Cir. 2007). Two dated cases— Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 
F.Supp 1372 (D. Del. 1977) United States Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-
Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1984)—also provide insight on the viability of 
misappropriation claims in the sports industry. In NFL v. Delaware, the court 
rejected the NFL’s misappropriation claim (among others) and found that gambling 
on NFL games “has not injured [plaintiffs].” 435 F.Supp. at 1378. In the golf case, 
the Third Circuit keyed in on the lack of direct competition between the parties: 
“Indirect competition of this sort—use of information in competition with the 
creator outside of its primary market—falls outside the scope of the 
misappropriation doctrine, since the public interest in providing an additional 
incentive to the creator or gatherer of information.” 749 F.2d at 1038. 
255  Soothsayer-worthy scholars have forecasted the importance of real-time sports 
data. See Louis Klein, National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.: Future 
Prospects for Protecting Real-Time Information, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 585 
(1998). See also Gary R. Roberts, The Scope of the Exclusive Right to Control 
Dissemination of Real-Time Sports Event Information, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
167, 186-87 (2004) (“The question here is whether there is a[n]…overriding 
justification with respect to rights of sports event promoters to control the 
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First, in NBA v. Motorola, the Second Circuit ruled against the NBA in a 
‘hot news’ misappropriation case involving a mobile pager system created by 
Motorola and STATS that tracked in-game statistics such as the score and time 
remaining.256 The appellate court held “that a narrow ‘hot news’ exception does 
survive preemption. However, we also hold that appellants’ transmission of 
‘real-time’ NBA game scores and information tabulated from television and 
radio broadcasts of games in progress does not constitute misappropriation of 
‘hot news’ that is the property of the NBA.”257 To survive preemption by federal 
copyright law, the Second Circuit offered a test with five requirements that the 
court concluded the NBA did not meet: 
 
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the 
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant’s use of the information 
constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts; (iv) the defendant is in 
direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; 
and (v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the 
plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product 
or service that its existence or quality would be substantially 
threatened.258 
 
In the course of the litigation, the NBA argued that it “has adopted certain 
limitations with respect to reporting on NBA games in progress in order to 
‘preserve the value of its proprietary interests’ in real-time NBA game 
information.”259 The NBA also wrote that “restrictions on the use of real-time 
NBA game information also apply to ticket holders, who are prohibited from 
transmitting any information, descriptions, or accounts of games in progress.”260 
 
information about their events. It appears that except in the case of a promoter that 
can prove that a ‘hot news’ situation exists, there is not such an overriding public 
interest…Once the promoter can profit sufficiently from expending the effort and 
resources to produce, market, and sell its sports entertainment product, there 
appears to be no public benefit from allowing the promoter to use the legal system 
offensively to reap competitive profits by restricting the flow of information the 
public wants…Only statistical data specifically compiled by the promoter about a 
sports event that is broadcast live will remain within the promoter’s exclusive 
commercial control. That is no doubt far less than most sports leagues and 
governing bodies would like.”) 
256  NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1997). 
257  Id. at 843. 
258  Id. at 845. In a footnote, the Second Circuit explained that it did not reach any 
conclusion on the First Amendment and laches defenses raised by Motorola and 
STATS. Id. at 854 n. 10. 
259  Brief of Appellees-Cross-Appellants the National Basketball Association and 
NBA Properties, Inc. at 7, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 
1997)(No.96-7975)( (on file with author). 
260  Id. at 7 n.4. 
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The NBA explained that: “[T]he issue here is not whether the public will receive 
access to real-time NBA game information, but only whether defendants are 
entitled to profit from what they have neither created nor paid for.”261 Via an 
amicus brief, the NBA received support from the NFL, MLB, and NHL, with the 
trio explaining that they “share a common interest with the NBA in protecting 
and preserving for professional sports leagues and their member clubs, the rights 
to, and commercial value of, exclusive presentation of real-time running 
accounts of the live professional sporting events that result from their efforts and 
investments.”262 
The NBA v. Motorola case saw considerable amici activity focused on 
misappropriation and the preemption issue. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(“CME”) filed an amicus brief in support of the NBA.263 According to the CME: 
 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 indisputably preempts some 
types of state law misappropriation claims. It does not preempt, 
however, all state law claims of misappropriation of information. 
Section 301 imposes two distinct requirements, both of which must be 
satisfied for preemption: that the state rights are ‘equivalent’ to the 
rights within the general scope of copyright, and that the claim 
involves ‘works of authorship.’ In many misappropriation cases, 
including those involving taking of real-time quotations from financial 
exchanges, there is no preemption because the misappropriated 
information does not constitute a work of authorship…As the Seventh 
Circuit has explained, where the writings at issue are ‘a mere notation 
of figures at which stocks or cereals have sold, or of the result of a 
horse-race, or baseball game, they cannot be said to bear the impress of 
originality, and fail, therefor to rise to the plane of authorship.’264 
“State law claims alleging misappropriation of such quotations, sports 
scores, and like notations are therefore not preempted by the Copyright 
Act.”265 
 
Fourteen years after NBA v. Motorola, the Second Circuit considered another 
 
261  Id. at 38. 
262  Brief for the National Football League, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the 
National Basketball Association and NBA Properties, Inc. at 9, NBA v. Motorola, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 841(2d Cir.1997) (No.96-7975) (on file with author).      
263  Brief of Amicus Curiae Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Support of Appellees 
National Basketball Association, and NBA Properties, Inc., NBA v. Motorola, Inc. 
at 298, 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir 1997) (No. 96-7975) (on file with author). 
264  Nat’l. Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1902) 
(“Without the use of [Western Union’s] tape, [National Telegraph] would have 
nothing to distribute. The parasite that killed, would itself be killed, and the public 
would be left without any service at any price.”). 
265  Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 263, at 3–4 (some internal citations 
omitted). 
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‘hot news’ case and suggested that NBA v. Motorola’s five-part test could be 
considered dicta.266 Nevertheless, allegations of ‘hot news’ misappropriation 
continue to be furthered in court. As of June 20, 2020, the most prominent on-
going case involved one news outlet (The Capitol Forum) suing another 
(Bloomberg) in connection with subscription-based financial information and 
whether the hot news misappropriation doctrine is recognized in the District of 
Columbia.267 According to researcher Victoria Smith Ekstrand, “the hot news 
doctrine is part of state common law” in Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin.268 Another researcher 
concurred about the legal status of these fourteen states.269 
Issues pertaining to preemption are particularly germane if a federal court 
sitting in diversity involves a hot news claim that is recognized under state 
common law. CME’s amicus brief in the NBA v. Motorola litigation addressed 
this topic too: “Congress did not wish to displace state laws which afford a 
remedy for misappropriation of hot news, whether in the traditional mode of 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), or in the 
news form of data updates from scientific, business or financial data bases.”270 
The NBA pointed to the legislative history too: “[S]tate law should have the 
flexibility to afford a remedy…against a consistent pattern of unauthorized 
appropriation by a competitor of the facts…constituting ‘hot’ news.”271 The 
NBA told the Second Circuit that Congress was reminded of this in testimony:  
 
 
266  Barclays Capital, Inc. v. TheFlyOnTheWall.com, Inc. 650 F.3d 876, 907 (2d 
Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit issued another ‘hot news’ ruling the following year. 
See Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430-
31 (2d Cir. 2012) (preemption turns on whether the plaintiff shows “time-sensitive 
factual information, free-riding by the defendant, and a threat to the very existence 
of the plaintiff’s product”). 
267  DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 
2020). 
268  VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, HOT NEWS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: A LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE HOT NEWS DOCTRINE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 
15 n.45 (2015). 
269  Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury 
it or Revive it ?, 70 N.D L. REV. 781, 801-02 (1994). 
270  Brief of Amicus Curiae Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Support of Appellees 
National Basketball Association and NBA Properties at 5, Inc., NBA v. Motorola, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir 1997) (No. 96-7975) (on file with author) (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, quoted in Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Inv’rs. Serv., Inc., 
808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986). 
271  Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc of the [NBA] 
and NBA Properties, Inc. at 11, NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d. Cir 
1997) (No.96-7975) (on file with author).   
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Indeed, Congress was specifically apprised of the existence of this 
state law protection in testimony by representatives of professional 
sports leagues. See testimony of Philip R. Hochberg on behalf of 
National Hockey League, Hearings Before House Judiciary Committee 
on H.R. 2223 Copyright Law Revision, June 12, 1975 at 815 (noting 
that extending copyright protection to live broadcasts of sporting 
Events would leave unaffected existing state law protection for ‘unfair 
competition where there was a radio pickup of a live broadcast of a 
game in the Pittsburgh Athletic Club case’); id. at 803 (testimony of 
Bowie Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball, referring to existing 
protection under INS).272   
 
The on-going ‘hot news’ case involving The Capitol Forum and Bloomberg 
provides a case study about how Motorola and other precedent are currently 
positioned.273 In a January 2020 court filing, Bloomberg repeatedly cited Feist 
and emphasized that “raw facts may be copied at will”274 and “[t]hat there can 
be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”275 Bloomberg also 
keyed in on how timely newsgathering is protected by the First Amendment: “the 
press may not be punished for ‘lawfully obtain[ing] truthful information about a 
matter of public significance’”276 given that “‘speech on public issues occupies 
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled to 
special protection.’”277 Finally, Bloomberg flagged potential “chilling effects” 
that could result if any rule were adopted that would strip away “‘protection for 
seeking out the news.’”278 
In a sub-section devoted to arguing that the ‘hot news’ misappropriation tort 
runs counter to the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, Bloomberg also 
posited that “the freedom to use facts—even to ‘free-ride’ on facts gathered 
through the effort of others—is constitutionally protected.”279 According to 
Bloomberg, post-Feist precedent has “repeatedly confirmed that facts must 
 
272  Id. at 11–12, n.8. 
273  DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 
2020). 
274  Defendants Bloomberg L.P.’s and Bloomberg Finance L.P.’s Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 8, DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, No.: 
1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020 Jan. 30, 2020) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).  
275  Id. at 9 (citing Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)). 
276  Id. at 10 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., Inc., 443 U.S. 97, 103–04 
(1979)). 
277  Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)). 
278  Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
279  Id. at 17. 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
54 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1 
remain in the public domain, free from any restraint or encumbrance.”280 In 
support, Bloomberg cited to N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. 
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., finding that “all facts—scientific, historical 
biographical, and news of the day…may not be copyrighted and are part of the 
public domain available to every person.”281 Likewise, Bloomberg cited Sparaco 
v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP for the finding that “historical, scientific, 
or factual information belongs in the public domain.”282 Such precedent—
according to Bloomberg—means “[t]he Copyright Clause leaves facts in the 
public domain for all to use freely, precluding any claim of a property right in 
those facts.”283 
Bloomberg also looked to public policy concerns when urging the district 
court to reject the plaintiff’s ‘hot news’ misappropriation claim.284 First, 
Bloomberg claimed that “[t]he tort of ‘hot news’ misappropriation…would grant 
the original news outlet a temporary monopoly over…facts—an outcome that is 
inconsistent with the strong public interest in receiving important, timely 
news.”285 In support, Bloomberg cited Houchins v. KQED, Inc. and the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that the “right of the public to receive such information and 
ideas as [they] are published.”286 Second, Bloomberg noted “timidity and self-
censorship” concerns flagged in Bartnicki v. Vopper287 when arguing that 
“recognition of the [‘hot news’] tort would chill the lawful dissemination of 
important news by fostering uncertainty among news outlets as to how long they 
must ‘sit’ on a story.”288 
Second, the Eleventh Circuit decided an antitrust case in favor of the PGA 
Tour involving a media outlet claiming the golf tour monopolized the market for 
real-time news about on-going tournaments.289 The PGA Tour—as the 
defendant—argued that the plaintiff was “free riding” on its own live scoring 
system, which the court concluded “constitutes a legitimate pro-competitive 
 
280  Defendants Bloomberg L.P.’s and Bloomberg Finance L.P.’s Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 17, DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, 
No.: 1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020 Jan. 30, 2020). 
281  Id. (citing N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 
F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
282  Id. (citing Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 466-
67 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
283  Id. at 17-18. 
284  Id. at 18. 
285  Defendants Bloomberg L.P.’s and Bloomberg Finance L.P.’s Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 18, DBW Partners, LLC v. Bloomberg, 
No.: 1:19-cv-3715-RBW (D.D.C. 2020 Jan. 30, 2020). 
286  Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 29 n. 17 (1978)). 
287  Id. (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 n. 22 (2001)). 
288  Id.  
289  Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 55 
reason for imposing a restriction [on plaintiff Morris].”290 With the plaintiff only 
litigating the case on antitrust grounds, the Eleventh Circuit made clear the 
narrow focus of the case: “Before discussing the antitrust issues in this case, it is 
important to note what this case is not about. Contrary to the arguments of Morris 
and its amici curiae, this case is not about copyright law, the Constitution, the 
First Amendment, or freedom of the press in news reporting.”291 In its briefing 
at the district court level, the PGA Tour focused on property-related issues: 
 
Morris and the amici completely misunderstand the district court’s 
decision. The district court’s decision that PGA Tour has a protectable 
property interest in the product of its proprietary scoring system is 
predicated entirely on its determination that PGA Tour controls the 
right of access to its private events. And having complete control over 
access to its private events, PGA Tour also has the right to control 
access to the information occurring within its private events, at least 
until that information is publicly disseminated beyond the confines of 
those events.292 
 
Third, the Eighth Circuit considered a claim by a fantasy sports operator 
against MLB’s media arm trying “to establish its right to use, without license, 
the names of and information about [MLB] players in connection with its fantasy 
baseball products.”293 In balancing right of publicity claims with the First 
Amendment, the court found that the latter controlled.294 Indeed, the Eighth 
Circuit wrote: “[R]ecitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic 
performance of [players on MLB’s website] command a substantial public 
interest, and, therefore, is a form of expression due substantial constitutional 
protection.”295 The court also elaborated on how entertainment-related speech 
qualifies for protection under the First Amendment: 
 
[T]he information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily 
available in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a 
person would not have a First Amendment right to use information that 
is available to everyone. It is true that CBC’s use of the information is 
to provide entertainment, but “speech that entertains, like speech that 
informs, is protected by the First Amendment because ‘[t]he line 
 
290  Id. at 1296. 
291  Id. at 1292-93. 
292  Brief of Appellee at 34, Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., Nos. 03-
10226-C, 03-11503-CC (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2003). 
293  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007). 
294  Id. at 823. 
295  Id. at 823-24. 
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between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the 
protection of that basic right.’”296 
 
Supreme Court precedent has identified three types of preemption: conflict 
preemption, express preemption, and field preemption.297 All three types “work 
in the same way: Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights 
on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict 
with the federal law; and therefore the federal takes precedence and the state law 
is preempted.”298 The year 1964 marked the start of contemporary Supreme 
Court rulings involving preemption and intellectual property.299 In two 
companion patent cases—Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.300 and Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.301—the Supreme Court found preemption to 
apply: “To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the 
copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be 
patented…would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to 
be tolerated.”302  
Preemption issues vis-à-vis copyright reached the Supreme Court nine years 
later in Goldstein v. California.303 There, the Court found that “[a]lthough the 
Copyright Clause…recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it does 
not indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state legislation is, in 
all cases, unnecessary or precluded.”304 The Supreme Court tackled preemption 
and state-level trade secret laws in 1974, finding that federal patent laws did not 
preempt Ohio’s trade secrecy statute.305 In 1979, the Supreme Court similarly 
 
296  Id. at 823 (citing Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 
(1948)).  
297  Gov. Murphy v. Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) 
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)).   
298  Id.  
299  Potential preemption of state-level statutes in the areas of intellectual property, 
misappropriation/piracy, or unfair competition could be found via the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause or federal statutes. See generally 
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104(2) 
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 358-61 (2004) (discussing the so-called “dormant Intellectual 
Property Clause”). 
300  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
301  Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
302  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 231-32 (1964). 
303  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 548 (1973) (case involved a California 
law “making it a criminal offense to ‘pirate’ recordings produced by others”). 
304  Id. at 556-57. 
305  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 470 (1974). 
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concluded that federal patent laws did not preempt state contract law.306 Finally, 
in 1989, the Supreme Court cited the Intellectual Property Clause and determined 
that a Florida law restricting duplication of boat designs was preempted by 
federal patent laws.307 According to the Supreme Court:  
 
Thus our past decisions have made clear that state regulation of 
intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the 
balance struck by Congress in our patent laws…Our decisions since 
Sears and Compco have made it clear that the [Intellectual Property 
Clause] do[es] not, by [its] own force or by negative implication, 
deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the promotion of 
intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions. Thus, where 
‘Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom from 
restraint is required by the national interest,’ the States remain free to 
promote originality and creativity in their own domains.308 
 
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit added a twist to copyright preemption issues by 
intertwining a contract rights analysis in ProCD v. Zeidenberg.309 The case 
involved a digital compilation of numbers in a telephone directory, largely the 
same type of information deemed uncopyrightable by the Supreme Court in 
Feist. The Seventh Circuit upheld the no-copying protections in a so-called 
‘shrinkwrap license,’ rationalizing that “[a] copyright is a right against the world. 
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties, strangers may do as 
they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”310 Professor Jane 
Ginsburg summarized: “[U]nder prevailing copyright preemption caselaw, a 
contract forbidding copying is not equivalent to a right under copyright, nor does 
it per se violate copyright public policy.”311 Sports leagues looking to monetize 
sports gaming data will likely turn to ProCD for support when arguing to expand 
non-copyright rights via licensing and otherwise.  
States—like Tennessee, Illinois, and Michigan—that try to grant de facto 
 
306  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“The states are 
free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent 
with federal law”). 
307  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-165 (1989) 
(“The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its 
general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While 
that concern may result in the creation of ‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative 
symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of 
producers as an incentive to product innovation.”). 
308  Id. at 152, 165. (internal citations omitted). 
309  See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
310  Id. at 1454. 
311  Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of 
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 CIN. L. REV. 151, 166 (1997). 
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property rights in the context of sports gaming data are vulnerable to federal 
preemption. With no on-point precedent finding such a property right, any 
litigant challenging the ‘official data’ laws on constitutional grounds will almost 
certainly look to the interplay between the Intellectual Property Clause and state 
laws that arguably run counter to the Constitution’s limitations. Such an 
argument would be the strongest if any state positioned its law on 
misappropriation grounds.  
 
B. State  
 
Dozens of states have accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to regulate 
sports gaming in the absence of direct federal oversight.312 As state legislatures 
deliberated, numerous sports leagues—including a majority of the leagues who 
initiated and then lost the Supreme Court case—took to lobbying.313 One of the 
most common league lobbying objectives was to secure a statutory mandate 
requiring licensed operators to purchase news, information, and data from the 
sports leagues or the leagues’ designee(s).314 
Prior to the litigation that eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, 
some of the same sports leagues now lobbying previously sued different states 
on issues pertaining to sports gaming.315 In 1976, the NFL and all of its member 
teams sued the Governor of Delaware over the state’s plans to offer a football-
related lottery.316 In 1989, the NBA sued Oregon when the state’s lottery 
launched a betting contest connected to basketball scores.317 Twenty years later, 
all five of the sports leagues who lost the Supreme Court case against New Jersey 
prevailed in PASPA-driven litigation against Delaware after the state moved to 
 
312  See Ryan Rodenberg, Over a Third of the U.S. Can Legally Bet on Sports: 
Here’s an Updated Map, ESPN (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29170044/over-third-us-legally-bet-sports-
here-updated-map. 
313  Ryan Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine, and the 
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9 UNLV GAMING L. J. 99, 116 (2019). 
314  Id. 
315  If the sports league quintet were to sue certain states again—such as Delaware 
or New Jersey—there is a possibility that a res judicata issue could arise. Res 
judicata is a “a term that now comprises two distinct doctrines regarding the 
preclusive effect of prior litigation” and encompasses two doctrines—issue 
preclusion (“which precludes a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in a 
prior case and necessary to the judgment”) and claim preclusion (which “prevents 
parties from raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior 
action—even if they were not actually litigated”). Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., et 
al. v. Marcel Fashions Group, 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1594-95 (2020). 
316  Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F.Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977). 
317  NBA Files Suit Against Oregon Lottery, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, at C2. 
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permit single-game wagering.318 
 
1. ‘Commercially Reasonable’ Standard 
 
As of June 20, 2020, three states (Tennessee, Illinois, and Michigan) have 
enacted laws mandating the use of so-called ‘official data’ for certain types of 
wagers.319 Over a dozen other states have introduced bills that contained similar 
provisions. Such moves have resulted after considerable lobbying from sports 
leagues. Lobbyists have also sometimes proposed a ‘commercially reasonable” 
standard to which the ‘official data’ mandates should be measured. According to 
one report, the commercially reasonable standard in Illinois would be based on: 
 
The availability of an official league data feed from two or more 
vendors designated by the sports governing body, the use of such a 
data feed by another master sports wagering licensee in Illinois, or the 
use of such data feed by two or more sports wagering operators in 
other legal markets, shall be sufficient by not necessary to establish 
that the official league data is available on commercially reasonable 
terms.320  
 
In the first iteration of rulemaking, Michigan considered four factors in its 
determination whether pricing is ‘commercially reasonable’: (i) the availability 
of official data to sports betting operators from more than one source; (ii) market 
information regarding the purchase by operators of data from any authorized 
source including sports governing bodies or their designees for the purpose of 
settling sports wagers, for use in this state or other jurisdictions; (iii) the quantity, 
quality and complexity of the process that is used for collecting the data; and (iv) 
the extent to which sports governing bodies or their designees have made data 
used to settle tier 2 sports bets available to operators.321 
The second version of rulemaking in Michigan included six factors to 
 
318  Office of the Comm’r of Baseballv. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 293 (3d Cir. 2009). 
319  Rodenberg, supra note 312. The effective date of the new sports gaming law in 
Virginia—another jurisdiction with a statutory mandate pertaining to ‘official 
data’—is July 1, 2020. Whether all or some of the new state laws attaching to 
sports gaming data run counter to the dormant Commerce Clause remains an open 
question.  
320  Matt Carey, Leagues Propose Low Bar for Official Data ‘Commercially 
Reasonable’ Restriction, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE,Oct. 8, 2019, 
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/leagues-
propose-low-bar-official-data-commercially-reasonable. 
321  John Holden, What Exactly is ‘Commercially Reasonable” Pricing for Official 
League Data? LEGAL SPORTS REP., Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/36742/commercially-reasonable-official-league-
data-sports-betting/. 
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determine ‘commercially reasonable’ pricing: (i) whether the data is available 
from more than one authorized source under materially different terms; (ii) 
market information regarding the purchase of data used to settle Tier 2 sports 
bets in Michigan or any other jurisdiction; (iii) characteristics of official league 
data and alternate data sources regarding the nature, quantity, quality, integrity, 
completeness, accuracy, reliability, availability, and timeliness of the data; (iv) 
the extent to which sports governing bodies or their designees have made data 
used to settle Tier 2 bets available; (v) the availability and cost of comparable 
data from other sources; (vi) whether any terms of the contract or offer sheet are 
uncompetitive in nature, economically unfeasible, or place an undue burden on 
the operator.322 
Tennessee’s new sports betting law—which included an ‘official data’ 
mandate substantially similar to that found in Illinois, and Michigan—states “[a] 
licensee shall exclusively use official league data for purposes of live 
betting…”323 The phrase “official league data” was defined as: 
statistics, results, outcomes, and other data related to a sporting event 
obtained pursuant to an agreement with the relevant governing body of 
a sport or sports league, organization, or association whose corporate 
headquarters are based in the United States, or an entity expressly 
authorized by such governing body to provide such information to 
licensees for purposes of live betting…324 
Tennessee also created a nine-person Sports Wagering Advisory Council. 
Of the nine members, three are selected by the House speaker, three by the 
lieutenant governor, and three by the governor.325 As of March 1, 2020, eight of 
the nine positions had been filled. One of the governor’s appointees is Billy 
Orgel, who reportedly has a small ownership stake in the NBA’s Memphis 
Grizzlies team.326 One of the lieutenant governor’s appointees is Kandace 
Stewart, a lawyer and team executive with the Memphis Grizzlies.327 
Even after the law was enacted, Tennessee continued to tinker with the 
statute. In March 2020, the state held hearings to consider whether to amend the 
law in order to grant more power to the state’s Sports Wagering Advisory 
Council.328 For example, the amended law would have delegated to the Sports 
 
322  Matthew Kredell, Michigan Sports Betting Draft Rules Show Path to Challenge 
Official League Data, LEGAL SPORTS REP., April 30, 2020, 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/40454/michigan-sports-betting-draft-rules/. 
323  Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, § 4-51-316 (2019). 
324  Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, § 4-51-302(17) (2019). 
325  Jessica Welman, Who is on Tennessee’s Sports Betting Advisory Council?, 
PLAYTENN, Mar. 2, 2020, https://www.playtenn.com/who-is-on-tennessees-sports-
betting-advisory-council/. 
326  Id.  
327  Id.  
328  See Brian Pempus, New Tennessee Sports Betting Bill Would Change Some 
Duties of Advisory Council, TNBETS (Feb. 5, 2020), 
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Wagering Advisory Council the ability “to enforce this part and supervise 
compliance with laws relating to the regulation and control of wagering on 
sporting events in this state.”329 In addition, Tennessee’s lieutenant governor and 
house speaker jointly wrote a letter that stated, in relevant part: “There have been 
concerns brought to our attention that some of the rules, as drafted, may be 
outside the authority given to the Board or Council pursuant to the ‘Tennessee 
Sports Gaming Act.’”330 Such letter implicitly raised concerns over the 
permissibility of delegation. More broadly, the off-loading of regulatory 
oversight to industry-tethered metrics and boards comprised of industry 
members, raises the spectre of invalidation via the nondelegation doctrine. 
 
2. Nondelegation Doctrine 
 
To the extent that some states fully or partially delegate regulatory oversight 
of sports betting data to private entities—through establishment of 
‘commercially reasonably’ prices or playing a role in the determination thereof—
there are constraints that may apply. At the federal level, such constraints derive 
from the private nondelegation doctrine (via the Vesting Clauses) and the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.331 Among a majority of states, there is also a 
 
https://www.tnbets.com/tennessee-sports-betting-council-bill; see also Matt 
Rybaltowski, Tennessee House Tables Sports Betting Bill Amid Debate Over 
Controversial Rule, SPORTS HANDLE (March 10, 2020), 
https://sportshandle.com/tennessee-sports-betting-rules-regs-changes; see also 
Jessica Welman, Tennessee Lawmakers Considering Change in Leadership on 
Sports Betting, PLAYTENN (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.playtenn.com/tn-sports-
betting-possible-leadership-change/. 
329  Brian Pempus, New Tennessee Sports Betting Bill Would Change Some Duties 
of Advisory Council, TNBETS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.tnbets.com/tennessee-
sports-betting-council-bill. 
330  Erik Schelzig, Speakers Seek Delay of Sports Gambling in Tennessee Amid 
Questions About Draft Rules, TNJ: ON THE HILL (February 18, 2020), 
https://onthehill.tnjournal.net/speakers-seek-delay-of-rules-for-sports-gambling-in-
tennessee. 
331  Ryan M. Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine, and the 
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9(1) UNLV GAMING L. J. 99 (2019);  At the federal 
level, the private nondelegation doctrine traces its roots back to Carter v. Carter 
Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito—in separate 
concurrences—recently cited Carter Coal when describing the contours of the 
private nondelegation doctrine. According to Justice Thomas: “the ‘private 
nondelegation doctrine’ is merely one application of the provisions of the 
Constitution that forbid Congress to allocate power to an ineligible entity, whether 
governmental or private.” Dep’t of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, 
135 S.Ct. 1225, 1252 (2015). Similarly, Justice Alito explained: “there is not even a 
fig leaf of constitutional justification” when the government delegates regulatory 
power to private entities. Id. at 1237.  
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nondelegation doctrine that exists as an independent check.332 According to one 
commentator, “[i]t is generally acknowledged among the states that delegations 
to private parties violate state constitutions. Sometimes this is an absolute bar, 
but it may be conditional or expressed in dicta…Only Massachusetts and 
Kentucky have dictum to the effect that delegations to private entities may be 
valid.”333  
Private nondelegation doctrine concerns have overlapped with sports betting 
policymaking before. During a Congressional PASPA-related hearing in 1991, 
Massachusetts Lottery executive Thomas O’Heir warned the House: “[PASPA] 
would delegate to private parties the power to enforce…restrictions against the 
states.”334 James Davey from the Oregon State Lottery raised similar concerns 
with the House subcommittee: “This legislation…would delegate to private 
parties, the professional sports leagues, the power to enforce these restrictions 
against the sovereign states.”335  
The testimony from O’Heir and Davey was consistent with others. Senator 
Chuck Grassley recognized PASPA’s private nondelegation doctrine problems 
too: “[PASPA] would prohibit purely intrastate activities. The federal 
government has never authorized private parties to enforce such restrictions 
against the States. This legislation would do so.”336 Two academic co-authors 
agreed: “PASPA is vulnerable to constitutional challenges based on its 
procedural mechanisms…PASPA is facially unprecedented law, giving sports 
organizations the ability to trump state legislators.”337 
Even the five sports leagues who initiated PASPA lawsuits against New 
Jersey in 2012 and 2014 warned Congress about the private nondelegation 
doctrine.338 In 2007, the NFL, NBA, NHL, NCAA, and MLB opposed draft 
legislation that would partially nullify—via an opt-out mechanism—the online 
gambling restrictions in the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006.339 The five leagues wrote: “The opt-outs are subject to challenge in U.S. 
 
332  Ryan M. Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine, and the 
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9(1) UNLV GAMING L. J. 99, at 115, n. 94 (2019).  
333  Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties, 17 
GREEN BAG 2D, 157, 165-166 (2014) (collecting cases). 
334  Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the 
Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House of Representatives 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Congress (Sept. 12, 1991). 
335  Id. 
336  S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 14 (1991). 
337  I. Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game On for Internet Gambling: With 
Federal Approval, State Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 687 
(2012). 
338  OFC Commissioner Baseball, et al. v. Governor Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 
2009) (The same quintet of sports leagues also looked to PASPA when jointly 
suing Delaware in 2009). 
339  31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq. 
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courts on the grounds that Congress has unconstitutionally delegated its 
lawmaking power (to ban Internet gambling) to private parties (commissioners 
of various sports leagues and conferences).”340  
The prior PASPA-related concerns are equally applicable now in the context 
of sports gaming data regulations and the potential off-loading of regulatory 
power. Such concerns persist most pointedly at the state level.341 Accordingly, it 
is useful to undertake a 50-state survey to gauge the interaction between 
nondelgation doctrines and state legislative moves to regulate sports gaming data 
via deference to private entities. 
Scholars have probed the contours of the private nondelegation doctrine at 
the state level. Daniel Schwarcz teased out the “general principles that influence 
state court scrutiny of legislative delegations to private actors” and applied his 
findings to insurance regulation.342 Schwarcz found states have adopted a three-
pronged test that involves “(i) the public or private status of the delegate, (ii) 
oversight of the delegate by public bodies such as the judiciary or a public 
agency, and (iii) the delegate’s independence from the lawmaking function.”343  
Schwarcz found the state-level non-delegation doctrine to be “quite robust,” 
with “most state constitutions directly limiting legislatures’ powers to delegate 
their law-making authority.344 His review of the case law led him to conclude 
that “courts universally recognize that legislative delegations of power to private 
actors raise more significant constitutional concerns than delegations of power 
to government entities.”345 On this point, Schwarcz cited an illustrative Texas 
case for the proposition that “courts have universally treated a delegation as 
private where ‘interested groups have been given authoritative powers of 
determination.’”346 He also found that “courts are often particularly skeptical of 
delegations to private entities that hold the prospect of substantially benefitting 
those parties’ finances.”347 Schwarcz also pinpointed an important distinction: 
 
One of the most common ways in which state legislatures delegate 
authority to private actors is by incorporating privately-produced rules 
 
340  Letter from Rick Buchanan, Exec. VP and Gen. Couns., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 
et al., to Members of the H. Fin. Serv. Comm. (May 31, 2007). 
341  As of June 20, 2020, Congress has not enacted any federal legislation pertaining 
to the regulation of sports gaming data.  
342  Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional? 25 CONN. 
INS. L. REV. 191, 218 (2018). 
343  Id. at 217. 
344  Id. at 218.  
345  Id. at 224.  
346  Id. at 225 (citing Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 
S.W.2d 454, 474–75 (Tex. 1997)).  
347  Id. at 231-232 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Texas 
Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex. 
1997)). 
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or standards into statutes…Statutes that incorporate pre-existing 
sources are perfectly innocuous…However, when a statute cross-
references not just existing materials, but also prospectively adopts—
sight unseen—future changes made by private actors to incorporated 
materials, the statute transfers to those actors the capacity to change 
the law.348 
 
Prior to Schwarcz’s recent analysis, there were two 50-state surveys about 
the scope of the nondelegation doctrine.349 Most recently, Jim Rossi found that 
“among state courts, there is a diversity of approaches towards interpreting 
separation of power provisions for nondelegation purposes.”350 Rossi determined 
that states could be divided into one of three mutually exclusive categories—
weak, moderate, and strong.351 In “weak” nondelegation states—such Arkansas, 
California, Iowa, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin—legislative 
delegations are upheld “as long as the agency has adequate procedural safeguards 
in place.”352 
States in Rossi’s “moderate” category—where “procedural safeguards alone 
are rarely enough for a delegation to be valid”—include Alabama, Alaska, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and 
Wyoming.353  
Rossi also flagged twenty “strong” nondelegation states where “statutes are 
periodically struck down on nondelegation grounds.”354 Such states include: 
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West 
 
348  Id. at 222 (citing F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference 
in the States, 68 LOUISIANA L. REV. 1201, 1211-12, 1254-55 (2008)). 
349  See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of the 
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52(5) VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 1167 (1999);  see also Gary J. Creco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of 
the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 567 (1994).  
350  Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of the Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52(5) VANDERBILT L. REV. 1167, 1191 
(1999). While both Rossi and Creco were seemingly focused on the public 
nondelegation doctrine, their findings help inform the contours of the private 
nondelegation doctrine too.  
351  Id. at 1191-1201. 
352  Id. at 1191. 
353  Id. at 1198. 
354  Id. at 1196-1197. 
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Virginia.355  
Prior to Rossi’s research, Gary Creco completed a similar survey of the 50 
states and found that “state courts have upheld broad delegations of power more 
reluctantly” vis-à-vis federal courts.356 Like Rossi, Creco divided the states into 
one of three mutually exclusive categories: (i) states with strict standards and 
safeguards; (ii) states with loose standards and safeguards; and (iii) procedural 
safeguard states.357 States in Creco’s “strict” category require the “legislature to 
provide definite standards and/or procedures that the agency must adhere to when 
making a decision.”358 Such states include Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.359 
According to Creco, states with “loose” nondelegation standards and 
safeguards—which “allow delegations of lawmaking power to administrative 
agencies as long as the statute contains a general rule to guide the agency in 
exercising the delegated power”—include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Wyoming.360 
Creco’s third category—states where delegations are upheld “as long as the 
administrative agency has adopted adequate procedural safeguards” included 
California, Iowa, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.361  
Tennessee, Illinois, and Michigan—the three states with sports betting data 
mandates as of June 20, 2020—each have case law that speaks to the ability of 
legislatures to delegate authority to private parties or public agencies. Such 
precedent increases the chances that a plaintiff may consider a nondelegation 
doctrine challenge to the laws in one or more of such states. In Tennessee, West 
v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency found that leeway to a public entity 
would allow a delegation if it involved a detailed determination of some issue.362 
The Tennessee case did not speak to the permissiveness of a delegation of such 
a determination to a private entity or a public entity with membership that 
included an employee of a self-interested private business, such a professional 
 
355  Id. (For example, the non-delegation doctrine was applied in the context of New 
York horse racing); See Fink v. Cole, et al., 302 N.Y. 216, 216 (1951).  
356  Gary J. Creco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine 
in the States, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 567, 578 (1994). 
357  Id. at 578-601. Creco excluded Arkansas and Utah “because neither state fits 
within any of the three categories.” Id. at 579.  
358  Id. at 580. 
359  Id. at 586-587. 
360  Id. at 588-597. 
361  Id. at 598-600. 
362  West v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tenn. 
1974). 
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sports team.  
Like its federal counterpart, Illinois case law suggests that the state follows 
some form of the ‘intelligible principle’ test employed in public nondelegation 
cases.363 In Hill, the Illinois Supreme Court stated: “Absolute criteria whereby 
every detail necessary in enforcement of a law…need not be established by the 
General Assembly. The constitution merely requires intelligible standards to be 
set to guide the agency charged with enforcement.”364 The resulting Hill test was 
followed in later cases,365 although the focus was on delegations to public 
agencies, not private actors. In Michigan, the statutory standard handed down by 
the legislature must be “as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or 
permits,” with attendant consideration of how complex the regulatory topic is.366 
The Michigan Supreme Court also explained that the adequate standards and 
safeguards must be in place if administrative agencies exert legislative power.367  
 
IV. POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCRUTINY OF THE SPORTS GAMING DATA 
MARKET INTERNATIONALLY 
 
There is a decided lack of uniformity in terms of how sports gaming data are 
regulated globally. The International Betting Integrity Association—a sports 
gaming industry group—“called on all parties engaged in the supply chain of 
sports event data that facilitates betting markets, to come together to adhere to a 
global best practice[s] model.”368 Researcher Christian Frodl found that “the law 
regarding the ownership of sports data is unsettled,” with copyright only 
attaching in “certain situations” across a comparative analysis including Europe, 
Australia, and the United States.369 Given the limited scope of copyright, Frodl 
concluded that sporting event organizers “must rely on other proprietary rights 
and supplementary contractual measures to establish their rights over event-
 
363  Hill v. Relyea, 216 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ill. 1966). Following Hill v. Relyea, 
Illinois courts have also sometimes applied a stricter test that considers, among 
other things, the harm to be prevented; See Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co, 
369 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ill. 1977); See also Thygesen v. Callahan, 385 N.E.2d 699, 
701 (Ill. 1979).  
364  Hill, 216 N.E.2d at 797.  
365  See Warrior v. Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ill. 1983).; see also People v. 
Carter, 454 N.E.2d 189, 190-91 (Ill. 1982).  
366  People v. Turmon, 340 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich. 1983).  
367  Id. at 626. 
368  Stats Perform to Help Drive Global Best Practice Model for Sports Event Data, 
STATSPEFORM (May 21, 2020), https://www.statsperform.com/press/stats-perform-
to-help-drive-global-best-practice-model-for-sports-event-data/. 
369  Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of Event Owners 
Over Information and Statistics Generated About Their Sports Events, 26(1) 
MARQUETTE SPORTS L. REV. 55, 56 (2015). 
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related facts and information.”370 Such uncertainty is at the heart of an on-going 
lawsuit—as of June 20, 2020—in Great Britain’s Competition Appeal Tribunal, 
which provided the following summary of the initial claim:371 
 
The current litigation involves one data dissemination firm (Sportradar) 
making claims against a competitor (Genius Sports/BetGenius) and its sports 
league partner (Football DataCo).372 The lawsuit was formally filed after months 
 
370  Id.  
371  Notice of a Claim under Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998, 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, Case No. 1342/5/7/20 (March 12, 2020) (on file with 
author). The UK court subsequently attached a “confidentiality ring” around the 
proceedings; see Consent Order, Competition Appeal Tribunal, Case No. 
1342/5/7/20 (June 1, 2020) (on file with author). For an example of another on-
going dispute, see Ukraine FA Blasts Sportradar Over Unauthorised Data, 
IGAMINGBUSINESS (June 19, 2020); see also Brad Allen, Sportradar Accused of 
‘Unauthorized’ Data Distribution by Ukrainian Soccer League, LEGAL SPORTS REP. 
(June 23, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/42132/sportradar-ukraine-
soccer-data/. 
372  According to Sportradar’s official statement announcing the lawsuit:  
This legal action is embarked upon with reluctance and Sportradar has not 
taken the decision lightly. Sportradar had hoped to find a fair solution that 
enables it to build its own database and to compete effectively in the 
market, but that has not proved possible. Sportradar remains open to the 
possibility of finding a resolution. However, ultimately, Sportradar 
supports a competitive marketplace in which there is genuine choice 
between suppliers. This competition is vital for innovation, genuine 
product choice and fair pricing and we believe these elements are worth 
protecting. The step Sportradar has taken is focused on that outcome. 
Sportradar is, and has always been, willing to pay for access, and to be 
part of an integrated, accredited, and fair system of collection and 
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of media coverage foreshadowing the dispute. One media outlet reported that 
Sportradar sent a letter accusing Genius Sports/BetGenius “of holding ‘an 
unlawful information monopoly over publicly available sports data.’”373 The 
lawsuit, which is still in its early stages, could have relevance beyond the British 
market:  
The tussle centres around the legitimacy of Genius’s arrangement with 
[Football DataCo]. Genius accuses Sportradar of mining data from 
Premier League stadiums in violation of ticketing conditions, which 
state that data collected in a stadium cannot be used for commercial 
purposes. Sportradar argues that Genius’s deal with [Football DataCo] 
has created a monopoly that is contrary to EU competition law and 
therefore those ticketing conditions are void. The issue has become 
increasingly heated after Sportradar signed an exclusive deal with the 
 
distribution which enables competition. Sportradar believes that the 
system put in place by Betgenius and FDC does not allow for this 
outcome; and that the current arrangements are in breach of UK and EU 
Competition Law. This status is not only harmful to data supply 
companies like Sportradar, but also to the downstream market 
(bookmakers and their customers) where product choice is being restricted 
or removed in favour of an information monopoly. This is why Sportradar 
has now sought adjudication by an independent specialist tribunal in the 
hope that matters can be resolved fairly and equitably. Sportradar’s 
Statement on Legal Proceedings Against Betgenius and FDC, 
SPORTRADAR (March 4, 2020), https://www.sportradar.com/news-
archive/sportradars-statement-on-legal-proceedings-against-betgenius-
and-fdc/. 
373  Alice Hancock, Sports Data Groups Battle Over Lucrative Rights, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/395d3de4-e08a-11e9-9743-
db5a370481bc. For further background, see Owain Flanders, Genius Sports Still 
Open to Sublicensing UK Football Rights, but Not with Sportradar, as It Stands, 
GAMBLING INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://www.gamblinginsider.com/news/7791/genius-sports-still-open-to-
sublicensing-uk-football-rights-but-not-with-sportradar-as-it-stands. (“Sportradar 
says it is willing to make a sublicensing deal with Genius for a fair access fee, but 
Genius is declining to engage in any discussions to increase its own market 
share.”); Sabah Meddings, Data Firms Sportradar and Genius Sports in Legal Row 
over Football Bets; Battle Kicks Off over Rights to Provide Live Information for 
Online Gambling, THE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/data-firms-sportradar-and-genius-sports-in-
legal-row-over-football-bets-mdhh2m55l; Scott Longley, Football’s Brand New 
Heavies, IGAMING BUSINESS (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.igamingbusiness.com/analysis/football-s-brand-new-heavies; Ben 
Cronin, Sportradar and Genius Dispute Will Influence Future Data Deals, 
SPORTBUSINESS (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.sportbusiness.com/2019/10/sportradar-and-genius-dispute-will-
influence-future-data-deals. 
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NFL in the US [in 2019]. Sportradar said this was not a monopoly 
because all NFL games were televised and therefore anyone could put 
together a data feed from the live stream. Not all UK football matches 
are. But the stakes are high. The US is projected to become one of the 
most cash-generative betting markets in the world with William Hill, 
the UK bookmaker, projecting that it could add up to $19bn by 2023. 
US sports lend themselves particularly well to in-play betting — or 
prop bets as they are known there.374   
The initiation of the lawsuit was foreshadowed a year earlier when 
Sportradar raised competition concerns generally in the context of a 
commissioned report about gambling in tennis that included considerable 
attention to how news and information about tennis competition was utilized:  
 
Restraint of trade is a common law doctrine relating to the 
enforceability of contractual restrictions on freedom to conduct 
business. The risk of foreclosing a market, and the potential for 
competition law infringement, including the risks for the relevant 
International [Tennis] Governing Bodies, does not appear to have been 
considered in relation to Recommendation 1. For example, on the face 
of it, prohibition rules could amount to a restrictive agreement under 
Article 101/Chapter I. Indeed, para 212 of the Interim Report could be 
viewed as facilitating indirect collusion between relevant International 
[Tennis] Governing Bodies to ensure that specific obligations are 
universally applied to the downstream markets. In addition, a relevant 
International [Tennis] Governing Body will no doubt be concerned 
that if they are deemed to be dominant in the market for the provision 
of particular live scoring data, then the withdrawal of such supply to 
the various, already well established, downstream markets would leave 
it open to accusations of abusing a dominant position. Indeed, the 
specific recommendation that “International [Tennis] Governing 
Bodies to include in their contracts for the sale of official data to each 
data supply company… a requirement that the data supply company 
impose specified obligations that betting operators must fulfil and 
continue to fulfil, in each case as a precondition of the continued 
 
374  Alice Hancock, Sports Data Groups Battle Over Lucrative Rights, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/395d3de4-e08a-11e9-9743-
db5a370481bc; For further discussion of the impact the litigation could have 
globally, see Brad Allen, Sportradar Launches Legal Action Against Betgenius in 
UK Soccer Row, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (March 4, 2020), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/38690/sportradar-sues-betgenius-soccer-data; 
Matt Rybaltowski, Implications of Landmark Sportradar Lawsuit Unclear on US 
Sports Betting Market, SPORTS HANDLE (March 4, 2020), 
https://sportshandle.com/sportradar-2020-landmark-suit/. 
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supply of official data” will be of concern because of the potential 
tying obligations imposed in at least two related markets.375 
 
Other portions of Sportradar’s response to the tennis gambling report also 
flagged issues relevant to the regulation of sports gaming data globally. 
According to Sportradar: 
 
(i) Unofficial data is referred to in the [tennis gambling report] as 
if it is a ‘black market’ product. This is wrong, it is a 
legitimate product. There are no ‘rights’ attached to the tennis 
match data, which is publicly available information. Even the 
enforcement of a property right to try to restrict the collection 
of this data, that is such a significant and essential input for 
the betting market, is legally questionable, as well as being a 
resource intensive undertaking across such a large 
international tournament network.376 
 
(ii) Sportradar collects the data from audio-visual feeds and 
conducts its own manual data collection to create a database in 
order to offer a competitive product to the market. It is 
understood that some rights holders are not comfortable with 
such arrangements but (as stated above) it should also be 
made clear a) that there is no legal basis for asserting a so-
called “data right”; and b) that Sportradar is no different from 
its competitors in this regard. There is no major sports data 
company in the world that does not offer a mix of official and 
unofficial data to its customers. And whereas Sportradar has 
official data licences with organisations such as the NBA, 
NHL, PDC, ITF and Tennis Australia for each of these sports, 
Sportradar’s competitors are providing alternative sources of 
supply – just as Sportradar does for certain other competitions 
including in other parts of tennis. That is the market reality.377 
 
(iii) The nature of the obligations that the [tennis gambling report 
panel] has recommended in respect of the proposed conditions 
of official supply (both for data supply companies and for 
 
375 Sportradar Response to the Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis, 
SPORTRADAR at 103 (Aug. 2018)(on file with author). 
376 Id. at 41, 43 (citing Andrew Nixon, Data Collection from Sports Events: A 
Nonexclusive Future? LAWINSPORT (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/data-collection-from-sports-events-a-
nonexclusive-future (discussing “[t]he danger of information monopolies”)). 
377 Id. at 45, 47. 
RODENBERG 11/16/20  6:11 PM 
Fall 2020] REGULATING SPORTS GAMING DATA 71 
betting operators) is unfeasible and unrealistic. These 
requirements (whereby these parties must agree not to offer 
any unofficial tennis product or service as a pre-condition of 
receiving certain official content) disregards the reality of the 
data market and the legal position on intellectual property 
rights. Under the proposed mechanism, to take a theoretical 
example, the official data partner for Roland Garros, could not 
offer data on the other Grand Slam events, let alone the other 
Tours, even to the extent that they are televised and available, 
unless they were also the official data partner for those events. 
Similarly, a betting operator who took the same Roland 
Garros feed would have to commit that it would not offer any 
other markets (not even pre-match) on other events, even if 
they were fully streamed or televised, unless it had acquired 
the official rights (even though those rights are not legally 
necessary). This fundamentally misunderstands the data 
market, the legitimacy of unofficial data and the dynamics of 
data supply.378 
 
(iv) Provided that the “unofficial data” is independently collected 
and compiled (and is not extracted and/or reutilized from, say, 
the ITF's or the ATP's database without consent), it will not 
infringe any right. Therefore, while the Panel recommends 
and “hopes” that data supply companies or betting operators 
do not seek to establish markets based on “unofficial data” 
this overlooks the fact that prima facie there is no legal barrier 
to prevent “unofficial data” being collected directly from 
streams or even venues (please see below for our comments 
on the enforceability of ticketing terms and conditions and our 
other comments in respect of potential competition law 
issues).379 
 
(v) While it is well established that data generated during the 
course of competitions is an important part of a rights holder’s 
commercial portfolio, it cannot be said that the rights holder 
‘owns’ the data deriving from those competitions. There is 
currently no established intellectual property in sports data 
and there is no such thing as a “data right” per se. The data is 
simply publicly available information. From an EU 
perspective, this principle was explained by Floyd J, back in 
2012, in Football DataCo v Sportradar and others [2012] 
EWHC 185: “...if one allows a database right to attach to data 
which is created by the maker of the database the creator 
 
378 Id. at 95-96. 
379 Id. at 101. 
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obtains a true monopoly in that data. Such a result would be 
inconsistent with the objectives of the [EU Database] 
Directive. The Directive should not be construed in a way 
which gives a party a monopoly in facts….where a database 
consists of data obtained from sources available to the public, 
such as existing published data, the balance of policy 
considerations is different. There is (or should be) nothing to 
prevent the public from investing in obtaining those data from 
themselves…”380 
 
A. Europe 
 
Copyright provides little protection for news and information relevant to 
sports betting in Europe.381 Indeed, a commentator concluded that “[b]ased on 
national legislation in Europe, pure statistical facts of sporting events do not 
subsist any copyright work and are therefore not copyrightable.”382 With 
copyright claims largely foreclosed, the bulk of litigation in Europe has centered 
around potential findings of intellectual property rights attached to sports-related 
data and the controlling weight of the European Union’s (“EU”) ‘Database 
Directive’ codified in Articles 4(1), 7 of the Database Directive 96/9/EC of the 
EU.383 The EU’s Database Directive “provides so-called sui generis database 
rights to the person who has made substantial investments in the collection of 
data in the database.”384 The “sui generis protection for the ‘substantial 
investment’ that information compilers expend” is unique to the EU, as it is not 
 
380 Id. at 101-102 (italics removed). 
381 See Joined Cases C-403/08 & 429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd v. QC 
Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-09083, ¶ 98 (“sporting events cannot be regarded as 
intellectual creations classifiable as works within the meaning of the Copyright 
Directive…[this] applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to 
rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of 
copyright”). 
382 Bjorn Hessert, The Processing of Personal Real-Time Sports Performance 
Information of Athletes: A European Perspective, (Working Paper 2019) (on file 
with author). 
383 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. 
384 Hessert, supra note 382, at 5.  
Evidence is scant about the quantity of database enforcement claims in the EU. In 
2018, one company publicly disclosed the apparent resolution of a database-related 
claim. See Settlement of Database Right Infringement Proceedings Brought by 
Sportradar Against Betconstruct and Others, SPORTRADAR (July 2, 2018) (on file 
with author), https://www.sportradar.com/news-archive/settlement-of-database-
right-infringement-proceedings-brought-by-sportradar-against-betconstruct-and-
others/. 
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found elsewhere.385 
Such sui generis property rights—granted via the equivalent of a statute—
are unique to the EU and carry important implications in the regulation of sports 
gaming data.386 A number of legal proceedings, including lawsuits involving 
sports leagues and third party brokers of news and information relevant to sports 
betting, have arose, helping to define whether database protection can be 
extended to sports gaming data commercial arrangements that purport to be 
‘exclusive’ in nature.387  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has decided a series 
of cases in the past twenty years setting the parameters of how sports gaming 
data can be utilized, including whether any type of sui generis database right 
attaches. Multiple lawsuits resulted from a dispute about Premier League fixture 
lists and overseas betting operators use thereof.388 In each case,389 CJEU did not 
find any unauthorized use of such fixture lists, rationalizing that “the Premier 
League had not allocated separate resources or made specific investments for 
drawing up the fixtures.”390  
More recent on-point litigation includes Football DataCo v. Yahoo! UK Ltd 
391 and Football DataCo v. Sportradar GmbH.392 Both cases involved Football 
DataCo, a company tethered to the Premier League. In the Yahoo! case, the CJEU 
 
385 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of 
Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997).  
386 See Scott Longley, ‘Settled State’ Part 1: The Sports Data Debate in Europe, 
BETTINGUSA (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.bettingusa.com/europe-sports-data/; see 
also Harrison Sayers, US Data Laws Could Spread to Europe, Warns Provider, 
GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (June 19, 2019), 
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/us-data-laws-
could-spread-europe-warns-provider. For a detailed overview, see Study on Sports 
Organisers’ Rights in the European Union, ASSER INSTITUTE. (Feb. 2014), 
https://www.asser.nl/media/2624/final-report_sor-2014.pdf (on file with author). 
387 For a summary of a high-profile incident involving sports gaming data, see 
Chris-Stevens-Smith, Whose Data Is It Anyway? Part 1—Hull City Fan Caught Up 
In the Tangled-Web of Football Data, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.sports.legal/2019/09/. See also Chris-Stevens-Smith, Whose Data Is It 
Anyway? Part 2—Does Anyone Actually Own Football Data? SQUIRE PATTON 
BOGGS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.sports.legal/2019/09/.  
388 Case C-338/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Svenska Spel AB, 2004 ECR 
1.10497; Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 ECR 1-
10365; Case C-444/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon 
agonon podosfairou AE, 2004 ECR 1-10549. 
389 Id. 
390 Frodl, supra note 369, at, 78. The CJEU reached a similar conclusion in the 
context of horse racing. See Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Board Ltd v. 
William Hill Organization Ltd, 2004 ER 1-10415. 
391 Case C-604/10, 2012 ECR 115, ¶ 27. 
392 Case C-173/11, 2012 ECR 642. 
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determined that “databases may qualify for copyright protection if they, by the 
selection or arrangement of their content, constitute an original expression of the 
creative freedom of its author.”393 In the Sportradar case, the CJEU found that 
data broker Sportradar “violated Football DataCo’s sui generis database right by 
publishing online the results and information of these soccer leagues.”394  
Attorney Andrew Nixon set out a potential future model: 
 
There can be no monopoly in facts, and to seek to create such a 
monopoly engages Competition Law. It would likely be acceptable for 
the event organiser to charge a fair and reasonable fee for access rights 
to data collectors: they are, after all, the “landowner.” What the event 
organiser cannot legitimately do is licence access rights to one 
undertaking, to the absolute exclusion of all others. The irony is that a 
non-exclusive model, as well as having better prospects of being 
compatible with EU competition law, is likely to be more lucrative, in 
the longer term, to an event organiser, or rights owner, than seeking to 
squeeze maximum rent from one exclusive partner. It is also likely to 
have a positive impact on an event organiser’s ability to protect its 
event from an integrity perspective:  
 
Firstly, irrespective of any exclusive arrangement, data companies are 
likely to continue to send data collectors to venues to collect the data, 
whether it is labelled “unofficial” or not because that data is an 
essential input to their businesses, and without it they cannot service 
their customers. As such, the event organiser is better off monetising 
this demand in the downstream market more widely rather than trying 
to enforce exclusivity around access rights when such enforcement 
would be patently anti-competitive and open to challenge.  
 
Secondly, the reality is that a competitive market place benefits 
everyone, including the event organiser and there are inherent dangers 
in the market being reliant on a single data feed. For example, from a 
betting perspective, numerous bookmakers may wish to use more than 
one data feed, whether as a backup or a cross check. A number of the 
data collection companies which would ordinarily be excluded invest 
in rigorous reporting standards, quality control systems as well as 
checks on fraud and match manipulation. By restricting access to a 
single, exclusive undertaking the additional value created by a 
competitive market would be lost along with the innovation that 
accompanies such healthy competition.  
 
 
393 Frodl, supra note 369, at 79 (citing 2012 ECR 115, 27 at 28-32). 
394 Id. at 80 (citing 2012 ECR 642).  
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Furthermore, having more than one source can also guard against the 
practice of courtsiding. It is logical that multiple providers, attending 
sports venues, and competing with one another on speed will mean that 
these risks are at worst more easily identified, managed and reduced, 
but at best they will be marginalised and eradicated. The same point 
applies to so called “ghost matches:” this is less of an issue in 
sophisticated sporting markets such as the UK, but it is nevertheless a 
genuine risk attached to single source data feeds, particularly in respect 
of non-televised matches, and less prominent sports or events, where 
the bookmakers’ ability to verify particular results is restricted. It is 
also fair to state that a competitive data collection market would help 
limit the extent to which database rights infringement occurs. 
“Scraped” data is, by its very nature, less reliable than data acquired 
directly from sources at the venue (such as data collected by in venue 
collectors). These “grey markets” are more likely to emerge when 
there is a single source because monopoly pricing could create 
incentives for bookmakers to sacrifice reliability in return for cost 
savings. A competitive, multi-operator market would mean that a grey 
market is less likely to emerge; and lead to overall consumer welfare 
gains, as well as a tangible and long-term benefit to the rights 
holder.395 
 
Beyond country-specific laws pertaining to copyright and intellectual 
property rights, an additional consideration in the EU is the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),396 which is focused on a more personal level. 
The GDPR defines ‘real-time sports performance information’ as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person in connection 
with her or his sporting activity, including numbers, tracking, and video 
recording.”397 According to a commentator, the GDPR may provide a buffer of 
sorts—via a consent requirement—against centralized sports gaming data 
commercialization, with athletes in the EU perhaps “hav[ing] a right of 
compensation under…GDPR if the usage of personal real-time sports 
performance information constitutes a violation of [the GDPR].”398 
 
1. Great Britain 
 
395 Andrew Nixon, Data Collection from Sports Events: A Nonexclusive Future? 
LAWINSPORT (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/data-
collection-from-sports-events-a-nonexclusive-future. 
396 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 26, 
2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 2016 O.J. 
(L 119/1). 
397 Id. at Art. 4. 
398  Hessert, supra note 382, at 8. (“The collection of personal real-time sports 
performance information falls within the substantive scope…of the GDPR.”). 
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Two cases that resulted in CJEU rulings—Football DataCo v. Yahoo! UK 
Ltd and Football DataCo v. Sportradar GmbH—also resulted in legal decisions 
being issued by British courts. In the Yahoo! case, “the High Court of Justice 
‘issu[ed] a sealed Order declaring that fixture lists are not protected by database 
copyright or database rights in the [United Kingdom’”].399 In contrast, the 
Sportradar case “first recognized the protection of sports databases under article 
7 of the Database Directive [and] found that the live collection of the results and 
further data relating to the professional leagues in the United Kingdom and the 
processing in Football DataCo’s databases constituted a substantial investment 
by Football DataCo, which met the standards under European law for sui generis 
protection.”400 Researcher Frodl described the importance of the ruling in Great 
Britain and beyond: 
 
The court precisely differentiated between sports data that is tied to the 
organization of the sporting competition, such as fixture lists, and 
sports data that is generated separately by observing the game. 
Following this decision, sports bodies and sport event owners may 
successfully establish an infringement of their sui generis database 
right under United Kingdom copyright law, provided they can prove 
that the sports data contained in their databases is extracted and 
reutilized without their consent. Because the decision is based on an 
application of article 7 of the Database Directive, its rationale can be 
extrapolated to other European Union member states. If this approach 
is litigated, however, sports database owners must prove that the 
particular data is de facto gathered from their databases—not collected 
independently by a third-party (e.g., by observing the broadcast of an 
event). In this context, the above-mentioned supplementary protection 
measures, such as restrictions on data collection inside a venue, may 
become pertinent. If implemented, the restrictions may enable event 
owners to successfully establish that the utilized data may only 
originate from their database or the data was gathered in breach of a 
contractual obligation.  
 
2. France 
 
Two aspects of French law are distinguishable from others in the EU in terms 
of how sports gaming data are regulated. First, the law provides “sports event 
owners and sports federations exclusive database exploitation rights.”401 Second, 
the law mandates that “any sports data usage by betting companies requires the 
 
399  Frodl, supra note 369, at 81. 
400  Id. at 82. 
401  Hessert, supra note 382, at 6 (citing Article L. 333-1 of the French Code du 
sport). 
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consent of mentioned sports-related rights holders.”402 In other words, sports 
leagues effectively have veto rights over sports gaming offerings and usage of 
news/information therein.  
 
3. Other 
 
An sampling of the legal and regulatory status of sports gaming data in other 
countries revealed wide variation. In Germany, researcher Frodl wrote that 
“owners of sports databases under German law may claim a sui generis right 
under Article 7 of the Database Directive, provided that the database owners can 
overcome [the] procedural hurdle of proving an illegal extraction and 
reutilization of the database content.”403 Hungary and Poland—like France—
enacted a statute bestowing “a right in favour of event owners to consent to 
betting on sports events.”404 New Zealand law similarly mandates that sports bets 
not be offered “without the written agreement of the appropriate New Zealand 
national sporting organisation.”405 
 
B. Australia 
 
Researcher Christian Frodl described the “legal protection of sports data in 
Australia [a]s heterogeneous.”406 When news and information are used for 
betting purposes, “the commercial interests of event organizers are protected by 
state laws, which allow event owners to negotiate a contractual agreement with 
betting and wagering operators as a condition to using…event-related 
information for betting purposes.”407 In other words, the Australian “regulatory 
regimes require betting and wagering operators to receive approval of, or enter 
into an agreement with, sports governing bodies for the use of…information 
relating to their sports events.”408 Such mandates are most prominent in Victoria, 
Australia, where “a sports event must be approved by the Victorian Commission 
for Gambling and Liquor Regulations as a condition to offer bets on such 
events.”409 
Statutory law in Australia was enacted under the shadow of a historical court 
ruling dismissive of the notion that news and information about a sporting event 
could be owned and/or controlled. In Victoria Park Racing & Recreation 
 
402  Id. 
403  Frodl, supra note 369, at 85. 
404  Id. at 85 n.170. 
405  Racing Act 2003, s 55 (N.Z.). 
406  Frodl, supra note 369, at 66. 
407  Id. 
408  Id. (citing, among others, Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Victoria) ss 2.5 19, 
4.5.1 (Australia)). 
409  Id.  
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Grounds Co. v. Taylor,410 a dispute about the broadcasting of a sporting event, 
the court found that it “has not been referred to any authority in English law 
which supports the general contention that if a person chooses to organize an 
entertainment or do anything else which other persons are able to see he has a 
right to obtain from a court an order that they shall not describe to anybody what 
they see.”411 Further, the court found that “a person who creates an event or 
spectacle does not thereby entitle himself to the exclusive right of first publishing 
the ‘news’ or photograph of the event or spectacle.”412 Likewise, a “‘spectacle’ 
cannot be ‘owned’ in any ordinary sense of that word.”413 Nevertheless, the court 
did suggest that ticketing for admittance to the event could be employed to inhibit 
access.414 
In July 2012, a consulting firm completed a study entitled ‘Optimal Product 
Fee Models for Australian Sporting Bodies’ and addressed sports gaming 
regulatory issues.415 The report found that “sports wagering is a clear ‘two sided’ 
market, where it is in the interests of both the Australian licensed wagering 
operators and the sporting codes to maintain a competitive, innovative wagering 
product that will maximize returns to both sides.”416 Among other things, the 
report focused on the symbiotic relationship between sports viewing and sports 
gaming: “Sporting codes will increasingly benefit from wagering as it increases 
viewing of sports and potentially the rates they can charge sponsors of their 
events…[w]agering operators in turn benefit from increased sports viewing 
because of its impact on demand for wagering related to the event.”417 The report 
also focused on integrity concerns, finding that weakness in either sports betting 
or the sporting codes can have significant negative implications for both sides of 
the market.”418 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Regulating sports gaming data is as complex as it is timely.419 While the 
 
410  Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v. Taylor, 58 CLR 479 (1937). 
411  Id. at 496.  
412  Id. at 518. 
413  Id. at 496. 
414  Id. at 494. 
415  DELOITTE, OPTIMAL PRODUCT FEE MODELS FOR AUSTRALIAN SPORTING 
BODIES (2012) (on file with author). 
416  Id. at 6. 
417  Id. at 18. 
418  Id. at 19. 
419  Given the dynamic nature of the global pandemic as of August 7, 2020, this 
paper does not endeavor to provide any soothsayer-type of insight into how the 
regulation of sports gaming data will be impacted vis-à-vis the worldwide public 
health issues that have affected the sports gaming industry in ways unimaginable at 
the start of 2020. With that said, five noteworthy developments have emerged. 
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regulation of sports gaming data has primarily been in focus of late within the 
context of the nascent U.S. market, the issue is global and impacts the entire 
commercialized sports ecosystem. Indeed, the sheer number of industry-relevant 
players makes it difficult to capture all the varied—and sometimes competing—
interests at play. For example, private sector stakeholders with a tethered interest 
in the regulation of sports gaming data include sports gaming consumers, sports 
gaming operators, sports leagues, athletes and their labor unions, advertisers, 
broadcasters, data dissemination firms, sports fans, and journalists. In the public 
 
First, somewhat obscure sporting events have become popular with bettors. See 
Paula Lavigne, et al., Gambling on Table Tennis is Blowing Up—But Are the 
Matches Legit?, ESPN (May 25, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29206521/gambling-table-tennis-blowing-
the-matches-legit. See also Borja Garcia-Garcia, et al., The Impact of Covid-19 on 
Sports: A Mid-Way Assessment, INT’L SPORTS L. J. (forthcoming 2020). Second, 
companies in the business of selling news and information relevant for sports 
gaming have prominently moved to fund and/or organize sporting events with an 
eye towards creating sports gaming content that can be wagered upon. See David 
Purdum, Betting Companies Help Get Tennis Players Back on the Court, ESPN 
(June 17, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29315110/betting-
companies-help-get-tennis-players-back-court. See also Luke Massey, Net Gains: 
How Sportradar is Helping to Bring Back Tennis, SBCNEWS (May 21, 2020), 
https://sbcnews.co.uk/features/2020/05/21/net-gains-sportradar-helping-bring-
tennis-back/. Third, with multiple U.S.-based sports leagues planning to resume 
games without spectators on-site, there will be a quasi-natural experiment to: (i) 
evaluate data dissemination strategies in the absence of courtsiders and (ii) test the 
scope of the safe harbor under the Wire Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2018). See 
also United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1979) (“we reject 
appellant’s blanket assertion that suppliers of line information are outside the scope 
of § 1084(b)”); United States v. Ross, 1999 WL 782749, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 
1999) (“transmissions reporting the results of sporting events, the odds placed on 
particular contests by odds-makers, or the identities of persons seeking to place bets 
would be examples of ‘information’ [under § 1084(b)]”); Jared Diamond, Baseball 
Stadiums are Closed to Fans, but this Guy’s Balcony is Open for Business, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (June 30, 2020, 9:08 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/baseball-stadiums-major-league-baseball-padres-
nationals-petco-stadium-11593522380. Fourth, certain states—such as Michigan—
have moved to promulgate draft regulations aimed at restricting long-running 
methods of information dissemination such as web scraping and live scouting. See 
Tony Batt, Battle Over U.S. Sports Betting Data Collection May Be Destined for 
Court, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/battle-over-us-
sports-betting-data-collection-may-be-destined. Fifth, some entities involved in the 
market for sports gaming news and information have moved to inquire about the 
prospects of certain best practices in the industry. See Scott Longley, The Best 
Practice Challenge for Sports Data, IGAMINGBUSINESS (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.igamingbusiness.com/analysis/best-practice-challenge-sports-data. 
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realm, lawmakers, judges, and executive branch government officials are 
increasingly dealing with sports gaming data issues too. This paper provides a 
roadmap—or a Whack-A-Mole type of preview—for all the complex potential 
legal issues that will likely arise in the regulation of sports gaming data moving 
forward.  
